Taken together, this UGS and UAS planning process will likely ensure that unmanned platforms will play an increasingly significant role in the Army of 2030.
The Network
Soldiers from 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division drive a vehicle equipped with Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) Increment 2 during the Army’s Network Integration Evaluation (NIE) 13.1 on Nov. 9, 2012. The next NIE, 13.2, will focus on the continued solidification of the network baseline, including the follow-on operational test and Evaluation for WIN-T Increment 2. U.S. Army photo by Claire Heininger
Another safe bet about the Army of 2030 involves the broad fielding of a proven tactical network capability. Emerging in the aftermath of the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, the Army’s network and its ability to link warfighters across formations is widely recognized as a critical tactical enabler.
Plans were for the initial tactical network, dubbed Capability Set 13 (CS 13), to be fielded to eight brigade combat teams during the current fiscal year, but that plan has since been scaled back. At the same time the Army is focusing its two FY13 Network Integration Evaluations, or NIEs (NIE 13.1 and NIE 13.2) on refining and improving a compatible Capability Set 14 (CS 14) network that will then be fielded to the next batch of BCTs.
The NIE/CS process is slated to continue well into the foreseeable future, establishing the foundation for a 2030 Army capable of successfully exploiting the entire electromagnetic spectrum.
Uncertainty Comes with Risks
As noted earlier, while some observations seem like “safe bets,” there are a number of inherent risks in attempting to visualize the Army of 2030. Service planners are quick to acknowledge the risks, and even identify specific risk areas that are created through adoption of the new Army Capstone Concept. Examples of these risk areas range from communications requirements that might be unavailable, to partners unwilling or unable to integrate, to advanced technologies that may prove to be unaffordable, to a lack of sufficient lift necessary to achieve desired global agility.
Staff Sgt. Nicholas Amsberry, an infantryman with Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division, ground guides a mine-resistant ambush-protected all-terrain vehicle in the unit’s tactical assembly area during Operation Buffalo Thunder II in the district of Shorabak, Afghanistan, June 28, 2012. U.S. Army photo
But service planners expect to find solutions to these and any other risks that might surface during refinement of concepts and capabilities as the Army moves into the future. Moreover, regardless of any DOTMLPF changes that might affect the Army of 2030, the underlying realities surrounding the world’s premier land force will stay the same.
“Our capacity to fight and win the nation’s wars remains fundamental,” Hix concluded, offering the current Army Chief of Staff’s “Prevent, Shape, Win” framework as “the foundation of our credibility and essential to our ability to gain access to and work with partners and allies to present war and then shape the environment to the benefits of national interests and those of our partners and allies; and to the extent that we are capable of doing so to contribute to stability around the world. But when you look at that broad set of missions it also demands that we are operationally adaptable and able to respond to the requirements of the combatant commanders and the nation with the right capability at the right time and place. This drives our ability to tailor and provide mission ready forces in small, medium, and large groups to meet any mission requirements. And from that we draw on the depth and breadth that the Army provides us in terms of military capability and the versatility of that force and its contributions to the joint force.”
This article was first published in Defense: Winter 2013 Edition.