In your experience, what influence do QDRs normally have on the overall structure, acquisitions, and doctrine of the forces within DoD?

The QDR has huge implications in every area. It builds structure, focuses acquisition and supports doctrine. It can also drive ad hoc units of convenience into real TO&E units. Again, there are many naysayers, but my experience is that it forces decisions and actions. I did not always agree with every decision, but at the end of the day, I felt we had a chance to make our case.

How influential is a QDR final report across the spectrum of the U.S. government, into places like the departments of State and Homeland Security, and of course the Congress?

I think that the final QDR report, when it eventually comes out, is going to be a pretty influential and important document. Leading up to the QDR report that is coming out soon, you can see all of the press reports and discussions regarding the road map for where DoD is going in the future. This has big implications throughout Washington, D.C., the Congress, and, of course, DoD. We’re into a period where we are trying to “balance the force,” and right now we’re building more capability to help train foreign forces, humanitarian efforts, and foreign internal defense-type missions.

That is a very important message to the folks over at the State Department, who find those kinds of efforts very attractive in their overall strategy. That DoD is going to be more engaged in helping nations defend themselves rather than only preparing for is a major war is an issue of great interest to them. I have no doubt that how we equip the National Guard and what kinds of formations we build for them will have a big impact on their capabilities and missions, something that the Department of Homeland Security has a definite interest in.

Given your experience with the QDR process, does it take several QDR cycles to justify the requirement to grow or build new units, capabilities, and weapons systems? Or can a driving situation like an ongoing conflict or crisis mandate a single QDR cycle for such growth and acquisitions?

Well, I think you have to break that into two separate pieces. One is what I would call “normal” or “peacetime” activities. These take a lot longer. The second, when you get into significant combat operations like those in Afghanistan and Iraq and the needs are more obvious, there the system tends to move a little faster. And even then it can take a long time. Now if you want to create something like a small SOF unit under SOCOM’s Title 10 authority to train, organize, equip, and it does not need a lot of resources, you can do that rather quickly. But if you want to stand up a new MH-47 Chinook battalion, then that is going to take a lot longer, often over two QDR cycles. Really I think it is a matter of priorities and necessities. I think it is pretty clear when you go into the “battle labs” of Iraq and Afghanistan where your shortcomings are, and you need to fill those in quickly. That makes the process move along faster.

When you were commanding USASOC and SOCOM, you headed a significant effort to expand Special Operations Force end strength and units following September 11. How did that process begin, and what were the significant milestones do you recall along the way?

As I mentioned first we [SOCOM] grew the schools. Then we aggressively recruited new SOF professionals. Of course there were timing issues with parent service processes and trying to grow the force, ensuring they were fielded with service common equipment, then ramping up the SOF purchases for the SOF unique equipment items. It was tough, and even tougher in the Reserve component units. Both took time. Additionally, all the services have very refined force-structuring processes, and forcing change quickly in a process that is that well-defined and regulated is difficult. And of course, military construction is always lagging, especially when you need new SOF or mission-specific facilities like simulator or maintenance centers. You can grow the forces much more rapidly than you can build world-class facilities and so at times the troops end up in sub-standard facilities. When I saw the numbers of 18s [SF soldiers all have 18-series MOS numbers], the Special Forces NCOs, start to grow after a long period of declining numbers, I knew we had a successful process. They had been traditionally very difficult to add to the ranks.