Defense Media Network

International SOF Year in Review 2012-2013

One dimension of Creek Sand is support of the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) against Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), formally identified as a prohibited terrorist organization on Aug. 22, 2008. Late in the year, AFRICOM began providing tactical intelligence, paying aircraft fuel costs, and delivering a military planning team consisting of 100 personnel from the U.S. 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) to Uganda, Southern Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – all members of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. In the business, the “operational preparation of the environment” is simply known as “atmospherics,” laying the foundations, often electronic, of future commitments.

This development is consistent with previous U.S. funding of an estimated 5,000 UPDF troops and 4,000 Burundian troops in Somalia operating against al Shabaab, the regional al Qaeda affiliate. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) paramilitary support is channeled through the Kampala Combined Intelligence Fusion Center, a liaison unit in the Ugandan Ministry of Defense, which runs air missions code-named Tusker Sand from Entebbe International Airport, where two converted Hawker Beechcraft Super King Air B200s have been based. Additionally, 20 Swiss-built, single-engine Pilatus PC-12/47s were the military version of which is designated the U-28A, and a Pilatus PC-6 based at Nouakchott, Mauritania.

Exercise Western Accord training 2012

To build proficiency for firing on the move, Marines and Gambian soldiers move from the 25-yard firing line to the 15-yard firing line during combat marksmanship training for Exercise Western Accord 2012. Basic combat marksmanship focuses on techniques and maneuvers effective in urban environments and close-quarters battle. Exercise Western Accord 2012 was a multilateral training exercise with West African nations to increase understanding and interoperability, prevent conflict by enabling Africans to provide for their security and stability, strengthen relationships with partner nations, and promote and support U.S. national security priorities. Participating nations included the United States, Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and France. U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tatum Vayavananda

These civilian contractor-owned planes are ELINT (electronic intelligence) collection platforms equipped with electro-optic imaging cameras that have a Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) capability designed to capture infrared images of personnel and hardware concealed under a dense forest canopy. They are fitted with precision geolocation sensors, sophisticated low-light detectors, hyperspectral imagers, and synthetic aperture radar, and also carry more conventional signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection hardware that monitors local radio, cellphone, and satphone communications traffic.

Creek Sand operations are coordinated by the Joint Special Operations Air Detachment from the airport at Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, which manages aerial missions in the region flown from Arba Minch and Dire Dawa in Ethiopia; Camp Simba at the Manda Bay naval base on the Kenyan coast; Mahe in the Seychelles; Camp Lemonnier at Djibouti; and Nzara in South Sudan.

There is a difference of opinion regarding U.S. objectives, with the State Department asserting that Boko Haram and al Shabaab do not espouse global ambitions and therefore represent a limited threat to international stability. The State Department is also wary of Pentagon “mission creep” and the negative political impact of increased reliance on drone strikes.

“We do NOT advertise the nature of our work, NOR do we seek recognition for our actions. … I am disappointed, embarrassed and concerned. … Today, we find former SEALs headlining positions in a presidential campaign; hawking details about a mission against Enemy Number 1; and generally selling other aspects of NSW [Naval Special Warfare] training and operations.”

AFRICOM’s strategy was to confront designated target organizations by the employment of local military surrogates who can be enhanced by the insertion of U.S. special operations forces in pursuit of intelligence priorities. The list was headed by Somali pirates, who were the subject of surveillance flights conducted from Camp Simba, and Yemeni insurgents, who were within range of armed MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper drones based at Camp Lemonnier and Mahe.

One of the significant internal debates within United States and international SOF circles during 2012 centered not on tactics or strategy but on policy regarding public disclosure, with a growing number of recent retirees taking up pens to reveal their participation in previously classified operations. Others are alleged to have provided restricted information to video game manufacturers anxious to insert some verisimilitude into their products.

Most controversial of all was the account given in September 2012 by Matt Bissonnette – a former SEAL who adopted the pseudonym Mark Owen – of his role in the Abbottabad takedown, as revealed in No Easy Day. The book’s release prompted Rear Adm. Sean A. Pybus, commander of Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), to issue a circular, “The Cost of Disclosure,” in which he insisted, “We do NOT advertise the nature of our work, NOR do we seek recognition for our actions. … I am disappointed, embarrassed and concerned. … Today, we find former SEALs headlining positions in a presidential campaign; hawking details about a mission against Enemy Number 1; and generally selling other aspects of NSW [Naval Special Warfare] training and operations.” Pybus asserted that “the security of our force and families is also put at risk by the release of sensitive information” and protested that unauthorized revelations “expose us to unnecessary danger.”

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Nigel West is considered the dean of intelligence writers. He often speaks at intelligence seminars...