“But our value to the nation is our ability to maneuver and adapt to situations as an independent three-ship ARG, responding to a crisis with a MEU on board. If that can be built into a larger seabase picture, to link up with MPF or some kind of seabase, without a doubt [the LPD has value]. But from a MEU perspective, seabasing is operating ship-to-objective, not ship-to-shore, supporting expeditionary with a very light footprint ashore – just enough to get the job done and get back to the sea.”

Eliminating the “iron mountain” – massive quantities of equipment and supplies moved ashore, in the past often not always mission-specific – also is part of the seabasing concept, Strock added. That is especially true now, where the number of permanent overseas bases is declining and U.S. military forces increasingly face area denial or no-access environments.

“To deploy and employ naval expeditionary capabilities from sea-based platforms on virtually an indefinite basis, we are enhancing our afloat maritime prepositioning program, which has been around for 30 years, adding new platforms to those squadrons that will provide them with a seabasing and naval capability for selective open ocean offload of rolling and sustainment stocks, the ability to support forces ashore capitalizing on the operational reach of the V-22, and so on,” he said.

“Years ago, we deployed a lot of assets ashore, creating and maintaining an iron mountain of supplies and equipment, then we would assemble forces ashore and maneuver to accomplish the objective, be that warfighting or humanitarian assistance. We are now focusing on how to better optimize the footprint ashore of the operating forces and retain as much of our various capabilities on the seabase as possible, projecting those ashore only as required.”

The greater capacity and design of the new LPD 17-class for more independent missions than the ships they are replacing also fits that need.

“Sometimes when an ARG deploys, once it is in theater the commander may split the three ships up to do different missions for the theater commander, such as a theater security cooperation effort or relief following a natural disaster,” Austin said. “It makes the seabase bigger due to its ability to operate independently.

“That was more forward thinking in the LPD design, compared to previous ships. We are trying to make our platforms multi-mission, multi-purpose in expeditionary warfare. We don’t have time to return to port to refit or re-equip, so the ARG is a great tool for the COCOM to use within the entire spectrum of military operations.”

 

The U.S. At Sea In The 21^ST Century

U.S. sovereign territory makes America an Atlantic, Pacific, Arctic and Caribbean nation, while alliances, military bases and national interests – both economic and security – combine to create the most ocean-centric nation since the end of the British Empire. Only Russia connects to as many bodies of water as the United States – but the old Soviet blue water navy has become largely derelict since the collapse of the USSR two decades ago.

With the end of the Cold War, U.S. military bases around the world have become fewer and smaller, leaving the ability to protect those allies and interests to space-based systems, long-range aircraft and missiles – and the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

Whatever terms may be used, that maritime force is becoming increasingly independent of shore-based support. U.S. naval formations now at sea or planned through the first few decades of the 21^st century may not (at a distance) appear all that different from those of the past century. But the combination of new, more mission-flexible LPDs, T-AKEs, MLPs, LMSRs, LCSs and even next-generation aircraft carriers are fulfilling many, if not all, of the original seabasing objectives to “provide joint force commanders with the ability to conduct selected functions and tasks at sea without reliance on infrastructure ashore.”

This article was first published in the USS Arlington (LPD 24) Commissioning publication.