Resourcing the AirSea Battle Concept

A U.S. Air Force B-2 bomber and 16 other aircraft from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps participate in Exercise Valiant Shield 2006 in the Philippine Sea June 18, 2006. An effective counter to the anti-access/area-denial threat will require investment in a range of systems and programs. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate Airman Benjamin Dennis
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A U.S. Air Force B-2 bomber and 16 other aircraft from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps participate in Exercise Valiant Shield 2006 in the Philippine Sea June 18, 2006. An effective counter to the anti-access/area-denial threat will require investment in a range of systems and programs. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate Airman Benjamin Dennis

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China’s rapidly improving military capability and its increasingly aggressive effort to keep U.S. military forces out of striking range are raising concerns about America’s future ability to protect its vital interest and its allies in Northeast Asia.

Beijing’s expanding and modernizing navy, air, and missile forces, the recent revelations of an apparently operational anti-ship ballistic missile, and the first flight of what could be a fifth-generation, stealthy fighter are part of China’s attempt to create what is known as an anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) shield. Those advanced combat systems, combined with improving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, are intended to nullify America’s superior naval and air power and make it unacceptably dangerous to attempt to project military power into China’s expanding zone of influence.

The threat was highlighted in a comprehensive 2010 report by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), a highly regarded Washington think tank, which warned that China’s “ongoing efforts to field robust A2/AD capabilities are threatening to make U.S. power projection increasingly risky and, in some cases and contexts, prohibitively costly.”

“If this occurs, the United States will find itself effectively locked out of a region that has been declared a vital security interest” for 60 years, and it also would “leave longstanding U.S. allies and partners vulnerable to aggression, or more likely, subtle forms of coercion,” the CSBA report stated.

To counter that threat, Gen. Norton Schwartz, the Air Force chief of staff, and Adm. Gary Roughead, the chief of naval operations (CNO), directed their staffs to develop the AirSea Battle Concept as a guide to better coordinate and integrate their combat systems and doctrines to overcome the A2/AD barrier.

But independent defense analysts, including CSBA, argue that an effective counter to the A2/AD threat requires investments in a range of expensive systems and programs that the two services have neglected in the past.

And, with the growing political focus on the soaring national debt putting intense downward pressure on the defense budget, there are serious questions as to whether the funding necessary to put real muscle into AirSea Battle will be available.

The CSBA document, which basically echoes Pentagon thinking, warns that, in a conflict, China would be expected to launch preemptive attacks against U.S. forces based or operating in the Western Pacific, seek to keep U.S. air and naval forces well out of striking range, disrupt their command and control networks, and heavily constrain operational logistics.

China’s goal would be to inflict substantial losses on U.S. forces quickly, thereby lengthening their operational timelines and nullifying the space and digital assets on which U.S. forces heavily depend for long-distance, high-volume communication, ISR, and precision-guided munitions.

China’s ability to execute its A2/AD strategy is being enabled by a vast increase in its defense spending fueled by its soaring economy. The Pentagon estimates Beijing’s military spending jumped from a reported $17 billion in 2001 to at least $150 billion in 2009.

The guided missile destroyer USS Benfold (DDG 65) fires a Standard surface-to-air missile off the coast of Hawaii as part of Rim of the Pacific 2010 on July 11, 2010. Rim of the Pacific is a biennial, multinational exercise. The Navy's Aegis ballistic missile defenses already exist as one counter to anti-ship ballistic missiles. DoD photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Mark Logico, U.S. Navy

That has paid for a rapid modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Air Force (PLAAF) and a transition of the navy from a small, outdated coastal defense force to a sizable modern fleet with increasing “blue water” capabilities. That fleet includes at least 62 submarines, with more being added annually, the Office of Naval Intelligence reported.

In addition to their torpedoes, the submarines pose a threat to the U.S. 7th Fleet by their ability to lay fields of modern sea mines. And the newer Chinese surface combatants are armed with an array of sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles.

To deter U.S. air strikes, China has been buying the latest Russian and Ukrainian air-defense radar systems and surface-to-air missiles. Although improving steadily with the addition of modern Russian fighters and attack aircraft and Chinese-made copies, the PLAAF is not yet a significant threat.

But a major concern to the United States and its Asian partners is China’s arsenal of about 1,000 short- to medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles, with longer-range and more accurate missiles being added steadily.

That concern was elevated by the Dec. 28, 2010, statement by Adm. Robert F. Willard, commander of U.S. Pacific Command, that he believed China had reached initial operational capability (IOC) with an anti-ship ballistic missile. The DF-21D medium-range missile reportedly has been modified to enable the warhead to maneuver to strike a mobile target.

If effective, that weapon could make it dangerous for U.S. aircraft carriers to close within striking range of China.

“The anti-access/area-denial capabilities, fully employed, will present a challenge to military operations in the region,” Willard told Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper. “That will have to be overcome.” Although U.S. intelligence had known that China was working on the “carrier-killer” missile system for years, its operational readiness had not been expected until late this decade.

Another surprising development was the disclosure in January, via Internet photos, of early tests of the J-20, a modern and stealthy fighter that resembled the U.S. F-22 Raptor.

Defense analysts differed over whether the J-20 was intended to be a counter to U.S. fighters and bombers or a long-range strike aircraft that could launch supersonic anti-ship missiles against U.S. carriers.

And reports from China indicate that the PLA Navy (PLAN) is preparing to put to sea its first aircraft carrier, which it has been developing from the partly built 50,000-ton Soviet ship Varyag. The oil-burning ship, with a ski-jump bow for short takeoff jets, apparently is to be used to train pilots and to develop carrier tactics while China builds its own larger and more capable carriers.

Vice Adm. David Dorsett, deputy chief of naval operations for information dominance and director of naval intelligence, conceded in a session with defense reporters that U.S. intelligence consistently has underestimated China’s speed in developing new capabilities.

But Dorsett said he was “not alarmed” by the recent developments. He questioned just how stealthy the J-20 might be and noted that neither the new fighter nor the refurbished Varyag could be fully operational for a decade. Roughead, in a separate appearance, noted that, “having an aircraft carrier is one thing. Knowing how to operate it and being very competent in those operations is something very different.”

Dorsett also pointed out that China had yet to put the DF-21D missile system through an integrated, operational test at sea to show whether it could find and hit a mobile target, like a carrier. He acknowledged that based on its overland tests and the development of extended ISR capabilities, China possibly could hit a moving ship with a salvo of missiles.

But Vice Adm. Scott Van Buskirk, 7th Fleet commander, said that the Navy does not see the DF-21 creating any insurmountable vulnerability for U.S. carriers. “It’s not the Achilles’ heel of our aircraft carriers or our Navy – it is one weapons system, one technology that is out there,” Van Buskirk told the AP in February.

Dorsett also observed that while China has been expanding and modernizing its military, it has not demonstrated the ability “to become operationally proficient in a joint warfighting, sophisticated combat environment.”

Dorsett said what most concerned him “is China’s focus and attention on trying to develop capabilities to dominate in the electromagnetic spectrum, to conduct counter-space capabilities, and clearly, to conduct cyber activities.”

The Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Tuscon (SSN 770) transits the Sea of Japan (also known as the East Sea) while leading a 13-ship formation. The Republic of Korea and the United States conducted the combined alliance maritime and air readiness Exercise Invincible Spirit in the seas east of the Korean peninsula from July 25-28, 2010. U.S. Navy attack submarines are among the counters to a growing Chinese threat. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Adam K. Thomas

China has declared its intent to master cyber warfare and is widely suspected of having used cyber capabilities to penetrate U.S. and other Western nations’ networks to steal technology and to cause minor disruptions.

China also is known to be developing both kinetic and electronic counter-space capability, which it demonstrated by destroying one of its own satellites with a land-launched missile in 2009 and temporarily blinding a U.S. satellite with a ground-based laser in 2006.

Those capabilities could enable Beijing to nullify, or at least reduce, America’s ability to use space-based assets to collect intelligence, communicate over vast distances, and employ GPS-guided weapons.

The potential threat of China’s military modernization drew an unusually direct notice Feb. 8 from Washington, D.C., which has tried to downplay the notion of Beijing as a likely adversary.

The new National Military Strategy said: “We remain concerned about the extent and strategic intent of China’s military modernization, and its assertiveness in space, cyberspace, in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea.”

The Pentagon’s fiscal year 2012 budget statement said the department had to be “cognizant of rising peer competitors,” which everyone assumes means China.

The CSBA report, written by a quartet of retired military officers and former Pentagon analysts, welcomed the Schwartz-Roughead agreement to develop an AirSea strategy to counter the Chinese threat.

But, it argued, a successful counter would require U.S. forces to withstand the initial attacks with minimal losses, to launch kinetic and non-kinetic attacks to blind China’s battle networks and to suppress its long-range ISR and strike capabilities, then to seize the initiative in the air, sea, space, and cyber domains.

To do that, the authors said, the U.S. military would have to begin investing heavily in long-endurance, penetrating ISR and strike capabilities, aerial tankers, forward base hardening, the combat logistics force, and directed energy weapons for missile defense. The current focus, they noted, is on short-range tactical aircraft and other systems geared to the present counterinsurgency operations against low-tech irregular adversaries.

In addition, U.S. air bases in Japan, South Korea, and Guam must be hardened to withstand ballistic missile attacks and protected by land- and ship-based missile defense systems and dispersal bases created on islands such as Tinian and Saipan.

The U.S. Air Force and Navy also would have to develop new cooperative doctrine that utilizes their capabilities in unusual ways, such as Navy ballistic missile defense ships protecting Air Force bases, instead of their own battle groups, while Air Force bombers attack enemy surface ships and lay minefields to block the Chinese fleet. Although Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both praised the Air Force-Navy agreement, so far, the response has been less than dramatic.

The task of drafting the AirSea Battle Concept has been left to a team of four officers from each service, none more senior than colonel or Navy captain, with no flag officer apparently involved.

No one mentioned the concept during the Feb. 14 defense budget briefings.

But the Pentagon has taken steps toward adding some of the capabilities needed to overcome the A2/AD threat.

In his Jan. 6 announcement of additional “efficiencies” in defense operations and organizations, and termination of several troubled weapons programs, Gates said much of the money saved would be invested in new programs that could counter A2/AD. Those included authorization for the Air Force to start developing a new long-range penetrating bomber, increased funding for the Navy’s nascent Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system and a new generation of airborne electronic jammers. There also would be additional funds for space-based communications and ISR systems.

Air Force officials said they wanted the new bomber to have an unrefueled range of more than 5,000 nautical miles and be able to operate independently inside enemy air defenses. With in-flight refueling, that range would enable it to operate from bases beyond the reach of most Chinese missiles and to join the existing B-2s in being able to penetrate advanced air defense systems.

In addition to a large load of weapons, the new bomber would be expected to carry sensors to conduct ISR and data links to share that intelligence in real time, and to perform electronic attack to help suppress the air defenses for other aircraft. It also would be “optionally manned.”

But, in recognition of the expected tightening of defense budgets, Schwartz said Feb. 9 that “we’re not going to be as ambitious as we perhaps were at one time,” in setting requirements for the new bomber. The bomber would have to use existing technologies.

The X-47B's first flight at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., Feb. 4, 2011. A future Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system would be able to strike targets far beyond the range of current Navy aircraft. Northrop Grumman photo by Bobbi Zapka

The Navy had already ramped up the UCLASS program last year, adding $2 billion to its long-range budget. The aircraft, which is expected to have advanced stealth capability, would build on the Navy’s ongoing X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D) program. The stealthy X-47 had its first test flight Feb. 4, and is expected to begin testing the ability to operate a fighter-size drone from a carrier in 2013.

The follow-on UCLASS, if successful, would be able to conduct strike or ISR missions from a carrier far beyond the range of current Navy aircraft and perhaps beyond the effective reach of China’s missiles.

Other programs that would advance the AirSea Battle effort against A2/AD systems already are in the works.

To answer the growing cyber threats, the U.S. Cyber Command and commands in all four services were created last year.

The Air Force awarded a contract to Boeing for a new generation of airborne tankers.

The Navy and Army are cooperating on building a force of logistical support ships, called the Joint High Speed Vessel.

And research and development programs have started on “micro satellites” and cheaper launch rockets that could enable quick reconstitution of space assets lost in a conflict.

The Navy also is funding efforts to develop laser weapons powerful enough to destroy incoming missiles and an electro-magnetic railgun that could strike targets 200 miles away in minutes.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Navy recently awarded a $218 million contract to develop and test an experimental Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). The LRASM would have greater reach than current anti-ship missiles, such as the Harpoon, and would be able to hit its target even if GPS were jammed.

Navy officials also point out their existing capabilities to counter China’s growing threat, including proven anti-submarine warfare assets using aircraft, surface ships, and perhaps the world’s best attack submarines; and the well-tested ballistic missile defenses based on the Aegis combat system and Standard Missiles.

The Army also is improving its ability to protect land bases with the Patriot Pac-3 and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile systems.

All of those programs and increased cyber warfare capabilities would be funded in the $553 billion defense budget request the Pentagon released Feb. 14.

The Pentagon’s top budget official, comptroller Robert F. Hale, said the Air Force’s “family of long-range strike aircraft,” which would include the penetrating bomber, would be “key to the anti-access program.”

The budget offered no money for “hardening” U.S. bases in the Western Pacific or for building alternative facilities.

But the authors of CSBA’s report applauded the initiatives Gates announced on Jan. 6, which were supported in the budget.

“Secretary Gates’ program decisions reveal a pattern of divesting systems that depend on relatively benign conditions, while placing priority on those that are well-suited for operating in far less permissive environments,” said Jim Thomas, CSBA’s vice president and director of studies.

The challenge for the Pentagon and AirSea proponents, however, will be protecting those new efforts during the upcoming budget battle; the newly empowered Republican majority in the House is demanding deep cuts in the proposed budget, including defense, and many Democrats would prefer to take money from defense to minimize the deep cuts the Republicans are proposing in domestic programs.

This article first appeared in Defense: Spring 2011 Edition.

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