“Continuous innovation and adaptation by the Navy and Coast Guard inform a forward-looking effort to describe ways to enhance our joint capabilities and address emerging threats,” the “National Fleet Plan” stated. “Our globally-distributed, mission-tailored forces contribute to homeland defense in depth and provide the basis for a secure maritime environment. As our interoperable forces continue to coalesce, we bring a robust blend of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power and a range of military options in support of national objectives and enduring national interests. The synergy generated from our ability to plan collaboratively and our proven experience operating together yield great benefits for security, stability, and crisis response. …”

One of the goals presented in the “National Fleet Plan” is to improve Arctic capabilities. “The opening of the Arctic will present the Navy and Coast Guard team with new challenges to ensure freedom of navigation, support search and rescue efforts, and maintain maritime security. The ‘National Strategy for the Arctic Region,’ along with the ‘[Department of Defense] Arctic Strategy,’ the ‘United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategy.’ and the ‘U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014-2030,’ describe how we will approach these challenges and opportunities by advancing our security interests, pursuing responsible Arctic stewardship, and strengthening international cooperation,” the plan states.

While the evolving threat and geopolitical situation has driven the updated strategy, the budgetary constraints have also been an impetus. Left unanswered in CS21 and the “National Fleet Plan” is how to pay for it all. Forward presence, recapitalization, and information assurance are all expensive. But the bigger question is what the cost would be if the sea services were unable to execute the missions called for in the strategy.

One way the two services work together is to constitute adaptive force packages that are tailor-made to a specific operational equipment as specified by a combatant commander.

Adaptive force packaging provides commanders with flexible, scalable resources that bring additional capabilities and authorities to meet mission-specific objectives. Beyond innovatively integrating ships or aircraft into task forces, adaptive force packaging incorporates transferable crew and equipment modules to meet demands and enhance effectiveness. Frequently, the capabilities or authorities required can only be provided by Coast Guard personnel. “Navy and Coast Guard forces routinely deploy together to conduct Counter-Illicit Trafficking operations, counter-piracy missions, Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction operations, Maritime Interception Operations, Antiterrorism, and Theater Security Cooperation missions around the globe,” the National Fleet Plan” stated. “Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure teams and integrated units must continuously refine tactics, techniques, and procedures in order to meet evolving threats. To effectively provide tailored capabilities and authorities, joint U.S. Navy/U.S. Coast Guard forces must fully comprehend the skills and limitations available, and understand the common terminology and tactics, techniques, and procedures to be used during operations, to include those of partner nations.”

The two sea services have also achieved a high degree of integration of intelligence fusion centers and maritime operations centers. This presents a challenge in that the Coast Guard is a law enforcement agency, and the Navy is not, and is precluded by law to have access to certain law enforcement information. Likewise, the Coast Guard, as an armed service, has access to classified information, which might not be shared with other federal, state, local, or tribal agencies. However, the sea services have largely overcome this challenge by establishing secure maritime operations and fusion centers to enable decision-making and integrated maritime operations.

The Coast Guard’s maritime force protection units charged with the high-value unit protection of SSBNs are a good example of Navy/Coast Guard integration, including shared platforms, doctrine, and planning.

Coast Guard officers with the “Defense Operations and Readiness” subspecialty are assigned to critical staff positions at Coast Guard Headquarters, Atlantic and Pacific areas, combatant commands, naval component commands, the Pentagon (Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Navy staff), and in various Navy commands. Reserve officers have opportunities at the Joint Chiefs, port security units, and combatant commands. These officers have the expert knowledge in how the Coast Guard integrates with the joint force in the execution of Title 10 missions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

While the evolving threat and geopolitical situation has driven the updated strategy, the budgetary constraints have also been an impetus. Left unanswered in CS21 and the “National Fleet Plan” is how to pay for it all. Forward presence, recapitalization, and information assurance are all expensive. But the bigger question is what the cost would be if the sea services were unable to execute the missions called for in the strategy.

“Throughout the course of our country’s history, the Navy and Coast Guard have worked together,” stated McQuilkin and Brown. “Our commonality is the sea, and together we have forged a strong national fleet in support of our nation’s interests.”

This article first appeared in the Coast Guard Outlook 2015-2016 Edition.