Interview: Australian Defence Attaché Air Vice-Marshal Kym Osley, AM, CSC

Air Vice-Marshal Kym Osley, AM, CSC Photo courtesy of Australian Defence Staff (Washington)

Written by: John D. Gresham on March 17, 2010
Categories: Defense-Wide, Interviews
Tags: Issues
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Air Vice-Marshal Kym Osley, AM, CSC Photo courtesy of Australian Defence Staff (Washington)

Air Vice-Marshal (AVM) Kym Osley, AM, CSC, is the head of Australian Defence Staff (Washington), and is located at the Australian Embassy in Washington, D.C. He leads a team of more than 420 Australian Defence Staff in the United States who are involved in military exchanges, intelligence liaison, delivery of major projects, support to operations, and science and technology collaboration. Osley provides oversight of all the Australian defense organization activities in the United States on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Angus Huston, and Secretary of the Department of Defence, Dr. Ian Watt.

The Year in Defense: Can you please explain briefly to our American readers, given Australia being in another hemisphere and fully on the other side of our planet, something of its world view and place in it?

Air Vice-Marshal Kym Osley: Australia is really a middle power; one that considers itself as a part of the broader world community, and who certainly see itself as very relevant on the world stage. While we are separated by several thousand miles from our traditional allies and from the European nations where most Australians can trace their origins to, we are very much a multicultural society that is an active participant in most critical issues of today. Australians are very comfortable travelers and world citizens. Most Australians have passports and we certainly use them – at a rate about 10 times higher, pro rata, than the citizens of the United States. We are proud to call ourselves Australians and very proud to call Australia home, but we also believe that in order to advance Australia’s interests at home, we increasingly need to engage with other nations. Therefore you will find that Australia is a relatively keen and certainly vocal participant in international forums, and engaging in the key issues that challenge us all today, such as how best to deal with the uncertain global financial outlook, or negotiating on problems such as climate change – our presence in Copenhagen illustrates that – and also, and very importantly, in countering terrorism.

It surprises some people when they find that Australia, despite having only a very small population of 21 million, that we have a relatively large gross domestic product [GDP]. We’re around something like the 15th largest [GDP] in the world. This, combined with the fact that we have weathered the economic downturn reasonably well, makes us regionally very important, and certainly important for the future economic recovery in our region of interest. And as a member of the G20, we have a key voice in the global economic community. Also, we see it as very important that we invest in security, and as a consequence, we have maintained a relatively high rate of investment, by world standards, in our military forces. We have about the 13th largest per annum expenditure on our military, which certainly makes us a significant military force in our region. Finally, Australia’s relationship with America remains vitally important to us and is very central to our new [Defence] White Paper [www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/] that has just been issued.

Talking about that document, this past year (2009), the Australian Department of Defence issued the major strategic White Paper, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, which has been given high marks for both its depth and detail. Can you talk a bit about it, and the points that you believe are the most significant in the long term?

That 2009 White Paper has involved a very comprehensive review of defense covering the complete defense enterprise and looking at capability requirements out to about 2030, including addressing the funding aspects – it is a fully resourced plan. It was conducted over a period of a little more than a year, and obviously we went into great detail in many areas. The 2009 White Paper task force drew in officers from across our Department of Defence and it was supported by a panel of three external ministerial advisors. In preparing the 2009 White Paper, the task force considered many things including a series of intelligence assessments. It was informed in part by information and views obtained through consultation with the community. It also included a complete force structure review; looking at the capabilities that we really needed to meet the overall strategic objectives, and it had an independent defense budget audit, which was known as the Pappas Review, that looked at ways of making us more efficient.

The strategy in this White Paper was built on some very fundamental judgments. First, while the threat of conflict between nations has diminished, it hasn’t been eliminated. For that reason, the main role of the ADF, the Australian Defence Force, must remain conventional combat. Secondly, intrastate warfare will be an enduring and more common form of war for the foreseeable future. And thirdly, we cannot know the future, so we need to hedge against the different types of risk. From our perspective, a balanced suite of capabilities will allow us to do this. We will focus on developing our capabilities to keep pace with military capabilities as they appear in the region. We have very good relations with all the nations in the region, but it’s prudent to plan against emerging regional military capabilities when one cannot predict what a particular nation’s intent might be decades in the future.

So, why the need for a new Defence White Paper in 2009? Well, it’s been nine years since the last Defence White Paper and we have not only had a change of government in that time, but the strategic environment continues to evolve. In 2000 when the last Defence White Paper was written, the events of September 11, 2001, had not yet unfolded. The 2000 Defence White Paper saw globalization and U.S. supremacy as the two key driving forces in that strategic environment. In updates to the 2000 White Paper over the next seven years, they introduced global terrorism into that strategic mix. Now there’s a complicated convergence of trends, which includes shifts in the distribution of economic, political, and military power within the regions, global demographic change, population movements, environmental and resource pressures, among others. These combine to make the future strategic environment very uncertain from our perspective. They’re cognizant of these trends and the White Paper makes a number of judgments about the global strategic outlook. The first point to make is that unless there is some unprecedented strategic shock, Australia feels very confident that the U.S. will remain the single most powerful and influential strategic actor over the period out to 2030. However, regional powers are acquiring capabilities that could limit U.S. freedom of action and movement more than in the past.

The second point I’d like to make is that the world of the future will be increasingly multipolar and more focused on the Asia Pacific region. If the last few centuries are characterized by European and American domination of world affairs – what I call an Atlantic-centric view of the world – I think we’re now seeing that the power is shifting to the Pacific and the Indian oceans, and will continue to do so in the next two decades. By way of example, in 1982, Asia accounted for 21 percent of the world gross domestic product. By 2006, this had risen to 35 percent, and a recent Australian Treasury report indicates that by 2030, which is the planned horizon for this current Defence White Paper, Asian economies will account for approximately 44 percent of the world gross domestic product. Hence, this Defence White Paper is most [appropriate], given its title, of Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century. The 2009 White Paper also notes, that in the period up to 2030, the Indian Ocean will become more important in terms of its centrality to our maritime strategy and our defense planning.

The 2009 White Paper also notes that the continued economic development that has allowed countries in the wider Asian-Pacific region to buy increasingly sophisticated weapons and systems will probably continue. A number of nations in the region now field modern submarines. They also have advanced fighter aircraft, upgraded missiles, improved air-defense systems, airborne early-warning systems, and unmanned air vehicles. Now, these are all major leaps in capability for these countries. Some are already in place; others are planned over the next decade or two. In general, Australia is not too worried about these capabilities in themselves. They certainly don’t need to be feared. In fact, some of these capabilities may be a boon for us in the region, as the more capable partners we have, they make for more effective coalitions when we work together – for example, if we work together in counter-piracy, counter-smuggling, or other maritime security roles. But in setting this strategic direction for the Australian Defence Force, we need to be mindful of the capabilities in the region.

If you can do so briefly, can you please characterize the kinds of transformational programs and activities the Australian DoD will be engaging in over the next two decades? Are any of these efforts the kinds that might provide partnership opportunities with allied nations like the United States?

The ADF is an organization undergoing transformational change over the next two decades. For example, we are seeking to gain synergy by networking our military capabilities. All our major platforms of the future will be able to freely exchange data between them and so we’ll be able to convey the mission-critical data through the system down to each soldier on the ground. This requires a significant investment in networks and bandwidths. That in turn involves collaborative agreements with the U.S. to ensure that we are able to do this around the world with good interoperability. There are also individual projects with the capability for enhancement that will result in an exponential increase in performance on the battlefield.

One of the key capability transitions will be in air combat. The White Paper confirms our government’s belief that the [U.S. F-35 Lightning II] Joint Strike Fighter is the best option to replace the current F/A-18 [Hornet] A and B models that we have in service. Also, the Joint Strike Fighter will eventually replace the F/A-18F [Super Hornets], which we are procuring to replace the F-111 fleet that’s being retired at the end of next year, 2010. Around a hundred of these fifth-generation, multi-role combat aircraft will be purchased by the ADF. The capabilities provided by the F-35, including its ability to be a network node on the battlefield and its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, will collectively enhance our defense capabilities and complement the other major capabilities coming into service.

Another of the headline capabilities that are introduced in the 2009 White Paper is the forecast procurement of a fleet of about 12 submarines. The Australian Defence Forces’ new submarines will be the largest single defense project in Australia’s history. The new boats will have greater range, longer endurance [on station], and expanded capabilities over the current Collins-class submarines that we’re operating in Australia. They will certainly present design and industrial challenges, and Australia will look in part to the experience and advice of the U.S. in the areas of submarine design and associated science and technology. Also, we’re procuring new air warfare destroyers. These were announced before the issue of the White Paper in 2009. The air warfare destroyers will deliver to the Navy a significantly enhanced air defense capability primarily through the acquisition of the [U.S.] Aegis missile and weapons control system that will be installed in each of the air warfare destroyers.

Another area where we’re entering new territory and gaining transformational capabilities is in the area of high-altitude UAVs, unmanned air vehicles. By 2030, our aerial maritime surveillance capability will be a mix of manned and unmanned platforms. The government intends to acquire a new maritime patrol aircraft to replace the aging P-3C Orion fleet and to procure up to about seven high-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned aerial vehicles to give us a persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability over our nearer regional areas. Each of these programs will require close collaboration with the U.S. and other international partners.

Australia and the United States have had a “special” relationship dating back to World War II and the Battle of the Coral Sea. In your mind, what form does that special relationship take today in the 21st century, and what does that relationship entitle each nation to expect from the other in times of crisis and need?

Actually, the relationship goes back further than that. The Great White Fleet probably represents one of the first interactions we have between the militaries back in 1908 when the U.S. Navy Fleet, which was painted white at the time, and was hence known as the Great White Fleet, sailed around the world and stopped in Sydney and in Perth and in Melbourne on its way around the world. In Sydney, it was met by something like 400,000-500,000 Australians, out of a population of about 4 million at the time. They were certainly given a very warm welcome back then. There were also very strong military-to-military ties established between the U.S. and Australia in World War I and in fact, the very first use of American troops in combat in World War I was at the Battle of Hamel in 1918 – which, in fact, was launched on the Fourth of July, 1918. Those first U.S. troops went into battle under the command of an Australian general, Gen. Monash, who put the American companies into larger Australian formations to give them some initial experience in combat. Of course, the U.S. troops performed incredibly well and they certainly developed a close rapport with their Australian buddies that they entered combat with. Then of course, we go through World War II, Korea, Vietnam – the list is long – right up to our current day.

The [modern version of the] alliance between the U.S. and Australia was actually first invoked in response to the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. Our Australian prime minister was visiting the U.S. at the time that the attacks occurred, and in very short order invoked the alliance and declared that Australia also was a coalition partner with the U.S. in the War on Terror. So, today in Afghanistan we have quite a large number of Australian troops, about 1,550 troops – that’s an over 40 percent increase over what we had earlier this year. They operate in Tarin Kowt in Oruzgan province, and they work with the Afghan National Army units keeping the peace in this quite active area of Regional Command (South). The units that they work with in particular are the 4th Brigade, Afghan National Army, and the relationship there is developing very well and the Afghan troops are progressing very well in their training.

Also, Australia around the world has accepted an increasing responsibility to take up its share of the burden for looking after a number of global security issues. In particular, we’ve tended to accept quite a responsibility for security issues appearing in our own region. Some of the best known examples of that would be East Timor back in 1999, the Solomon Islands, and also several responses to natural disasters where Australia has taken a leading role, for instance, earthquake and tsunami relief in Indonesia. Also, we accept search-and-rescue responsibility across the Australasian region.

The relationship with the U.S. today is very broad. I’ve mentioned that we have a close relationship in operations and we certainly work well as partners for the U.S. and the coalition. We have a very close intelligence liaison between the U.S. and Australia and have a number of intelligence-related shared facilities.

On the materiel side and procurement side, Australia is a great customer of the U.S, with something like on average over the past decade the fourth-largest military sales for the U.S. In areas such as science and technology, we have very close collaboration between the U.S. and Australia. There are individual exchanges between our militaries that are working to develop trust between our forces on a daily basis. We have Australians in Army, Navy, and Air Force units over in the U.S., with the same in Australia. We have a great number of Australians who come to the U.S to undergo training and vice versa. Conversely, many Americans [military personnel] go to Australia to participate in exercises out there, with the Talisman Saber series of exercises being one of the largest.

One of the things most coveted by the U.S. military leaders about our relationship has been the growing level of access to Australian ranges and training facilities, which are considered some of the finest and largest presently available. Does Australia plan to continue their programs of sharing range access with allies, and what are the long-term prospects for increasing their use?

Australia is an island nation, but it is blessed with very large tracts of land and it is becoming somewhat unique in having weapons ranges and training ranges that allow fully effective and unconstrained training to occur, including the testing of stand-off weapons with very long ranges. Australia has had a very long history of weapons testing and allowing exercises with participation by U.S. and other allied nations. At the RAAF [Royal Australian Air Force] Woomera Test Range, weapons testing has been under way for a long time. At Woomera, we had the British conducting testing there in the ’60s and ’70s, and the U.S. has conducted significant tests there since the 1980s. This has included many tests and activities being conducted in collaboration with Australia and also the ability for the U.S. to conduct the dropping of some conventional munitions there, as well as part of their ongoing [training and test] programs, such as B-52 training.

There’s also substantial U.S. training that’s been going on and conducted at places such as Tindal, which is an air base in northern Australia, and at the nearby Delamere Air Weapons Range. The use of Tindal and the use of the Delamere Air Weapons Range by Marine and United States Air Force aircraft have been going on for almost two decades. A premier event is the Talisman Saber series of exercises where every two years, we have something like a total of 25,000 Army, Navy, and Air Force participants from the U.S. and Australia get together in the various training areas. In the past it has been conducted at Shoalwater Bay Training Area and more recently at Bradshaw Training Ranges up in the Northern Territories and at Delamere Range, where they conduct realistic training operations and practice their interoperability.

In conjunction with that Talisman Saber exercise, we’ve also commenced an initiative, the Joint Combined Training Capability/Center [JCTC], where Australia and the U.S. can work together to use our technology to improve the quality of training and reduce costs. This JCTC allows for the integration of virtual and real training activities, so for example we might have an AC-130 crew in a simulator in the U.S. being linked through the telecommunications cables to Australia where it is then integrated into the training picture there and enhances the real-time training of the U.S. and Australians participating in Talisman Saber.

Also, we’ve had more than 30 years of Pitch Black Air Exercises; that’s our premier Australian air exercises over northern Australia where we use our excellent ranges and our very clear airspace to great advantage. I personally remember flying against United States Air Force aircraft in the early 1980s. I was in an F-111, so I will say we managed to get away from the F-4s, but certainly it was a great training exercise – and has been so for many decades. In recent years, it has really gone from strength to strength and expanded to include other regional nations.

Australia expects that these close relations between the U.S. and Australia will continue in the area of training and exercises. We’re already planning for Talisman Saber 2011 and every time we have one, they get better and better.

It is a two-way street. Australians also come to America and we train in the Red Flag series of exercises, which are excellent training opportunities. The Australian Navy and Air Force participate in the Rim of the Pacific [RIMPAC] series of exercises that are normally held out in Hawaii. Various other Australian Defence Force members are involved in exercises in the U.S. and other locations.

Now, the U.S. is planning to train many U.S. military [units] in the Asia Pacific [region] over the next decade or two. They need to be able to train in larger training areas for some activities, and so I think the importance of Australia’s training areas will continue. You can expect that the Australian military and U.S. Pacific Command [PACOM] will obviously continue to work on how we can best use those training ranges in Australia for both our own forces and to assist the U.S. where appropriate.

Looking ahead to the near term, what are the big-ticket procurement items for the Australian DoD? Obviously the F-35 Lightning II comes to mind, but what others are of critical interest to the Australian military?

Well, I’ve already mentioned the future submarine and the air warfare destroyer with the Aegis combat system on board. These assets are very important to us and certainly they will be critical to the overall capability that we’ve presented for 2030. In addition, we are also acquiring strategic sealift ships, notably two large amphibious ships that were announced before our 2009 White Paper came out, that can be used for transporting troops within the region and for also operating helicopters from – but can also be used for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

I’ve mentioned the planned procurement of about 100 F-35s already. In addition to that, we’re procuring 24 F/A-18F [Super Hornet fighter bomber] aircraft for interim replacement of the F-111 fleet that we’ll retire at the end of 2010. The intention is to replace these F/A-18Fs at sometime in the future and to move to an all [F-35] Joint Strike Fighter fleet to ensure we can provide the most economical life of type support. By 2030, our aerial maritime support capability will be a mix of manned and unmanned platforms and the government intends to acquire the maritime patrol aircraft to replace the AP-3C Orion fleet and to procure up to seven high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned air vehicles to give us that persistent intelligence and reconnaissance capability that we need.

From the land force side, there will be many programs that will be implemented. The Army is acquiring new artillery [systems]. And they’re looking at new armored fighting vehicles. We have already procured new tanks, the [U.S.] M1A1 Abrams, and also we’re looking at other initiatives such as the acquisition of two new battalions under the enhanced land force initiative and also will be restructuring the Army to combine its combat and combat-support units to generate 10 battle groups, each of them battalion size.

How is the Australian DoD doing at training and recruiting these days? Are you making the recruiting numbers needed to maintain key units and keep ships up and running? Or are you in need of specialists for particular systems and units?

Recruiting and retention are always an ongoing challenge, but we’re doing quite well. Our pay and conditions of service are considered to be excellent. Over the past decade, we have made great inroads in providing good housing to our people and our conditions of service on active operation, I would say, are second to none around the world. In addition, we have excellent training opportunities, but I have to say we’ve certainly had some periods of poor retention. Two in particular spring to mind, and that is aircraft pilots and also personnel for submarines.

We’ve answered these challenges in the past with a variety of retention bonuses and other ways of mitigating the risk. In some cases, we’ve used lateral recruiting to fill some positions, and I’ve personally flown with several of these lateral recruits, along with some from the United States Air Force and from the Royal Air Force. They are excellent pilots and excellent additions to Australian Defence Force. Needless to say, though, the current state of the world economy is probably assisting recruiting and retention levels at this time, and at this time we feel as though we have plans in place to overcome any of the short-term deficiencies that we have.

Over the decades, Australia has made a strong history of buying systems that are “outside the box” in the minds of other nations, like the F88 Austeyr combat rifle and Lockheed Martin F-111C/G Aardvark strike fighter, to fulfill unique national defense requirements. And while Australia appears quite willing to buy in the way of weapons and systems what they need from foreign vendors and countries, your country also is developing its own cutting-edge ships, aircraft, and ground systems for deployment with your armed forces. What are some of the present-day examples, and how might you be getting ready to fit them into your force structure?

Two that spring to mind are the future submarine and the [Wedgetail] Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft. As for the future submarine, the new boats will have a greater range, longer endurance, and more expanded capabilities than those of the Collins class [boats]. And while they will represent a design and industrial challenge, it’s really one we do need to face. These new submarines will be critical for giving us the freedom of maneuver and the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability when needed in our region of immediate interest, and that will end up being in many cases our eyes and ears to the north.

As for the Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning Command and Control aircraft, this capability has been on our books for a long time and finally we are seeing [it] come into service. This [system uses] the emerging technology of an electronically steered [radar] array, and while it will take additional time to perfect over more conventional technologies, it will give us an excellent air surveillance capability, one which will tie together our air defense system.

Historically, the armed forces of Australia have made it their business to be part of some very sophisticated operations around the globe. From peacekeeping to maritime interdiction, folks I know want Australian units and personnel in the forefront of such efforts, because of their skills and professionalism. Where do these capabilities come from? And what are you doing to maintain such capabilities in the future, both for Australia and your allies around the globe?

Certainly, Australia has invested in defense over the decades and we intend to maintain a balanced force and will maintain its edge through participation in appropriately high levels of training. The ability to maintain these capabilities is really driven by a well-resourced plan, which I think the 2009 White Paper represents – which includes adequate and enduring funding, which the government has committed to over the next few decades. It requires good access to technology, [and] I think our relationship to the U.S. and other key allied nations is a critical element. It requires access to well-trained and motivated personnel, which our nation has provided to date and which our educational system in Australia is expected to deliver in the future. And it requires adequate industry capabilities to support our defense capabilities, which in some cases will be a challenge, as in the future submarine. But the challenges are well identified and we will certainly have the time for our Defence Materiel Organization to work out the mitigating strategies.

What new sorts of operations do you see the Australian military moving into in the next decade or two? Humanitarian relief, no-fly operations, and anti-piracy seem to be just a few of the possibilities.

From an Australian perspective, while potential flash points do exist in the Asia Pacific Region – and I include Taiwan, the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea, and other “rub points” – territorial disputes and historical grievances – I think that Australia thinks that it is relatively unlikely that a conventional war will break out in the immediate future. From our perspective, the Southeast Asian nations are largely on a solid path of [economic and social] development and should be able to manage their continuing security concerns such as terrorism and insurgency. Indonesia’s democracy continues to strengthen and we are building a very solid defense relationship with our northern neighbor.

For Australia, the most likely military operations are, in the very short term, responses to natural disasters in our region. We only have to look back to the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia and the similar disaster in [Papua New Guinea] as examples of where we will continue to regularly be called upon to intervene and assist in the region. Also, other likely operations in the region are an ongoing search-and-rescue responsibility for the region, and we’ve demonstrated that many times.

As for dealing with insecurity – and I think the South Pacific region has had a cycle of economic stagnation and there’s been some political
fragility in the region – I think we’re going to have to watch our region very carefully and address any security concerns that our government determines the ADF should be involved in. So, the most likely operations [for us] are firstly humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and secondly stabilization operations such as those in Bougainville and East Timor.

How have you enjoyed your tour as military attaché here in the United States? What has been your most memorable and/or important experience during your stay?

I must admit my position here as military attaché and as head of Australian Defence Staff is one of the highlights of my career. The duties of Australian Defence Attaché are made much easier by the strong relationship and reputation that the ADF enjoys in the U.S. as a result of our defense forces working on operations. This goodwill has certainly assisted in opening doors. There are deeply shared values between our two countries and this means that issues can be worked through even though we obviously need to take account of each country’s own interests.

Some of the obvious highlights of my particular time here are the inauguration of President Obama and my team’s interaction with the new administration. Interacting with people in the U.S. military again has been a great pleasure. I have been able to build on the relationships that I developed in previous assignments: I flew with the United States on an RF-4C Phantom exchange in the 1980s and I worked with the U.S. in the Middle East at the Combined Air Operations Center. It is a pleasure to get back working with the U.S military and the U.S. Department of Defense personnel again.

As I’ve indicated, I’ve worked tactically before flying aircraft with the United States. I’ve worked at the operational level as Director of the Combined Air Operations Center and now I’ve been given the opportunity to work strategically with U.S. [government] personnel, and [specifically] Department of Defense personnel. It’s interesting dealing with issues across all the different areas that we get involved in: intelligence, S&T, policy, operations, and materiel. All in all, a great experience, which my wife, Debbie, is a very willing partner in!

I would conclude by saying that it’s the greatest honor and the most humbling activity I’ve had in hosting wounded warriors to the Australian Embassy on various occasions. I’ve come to understand the sacrifice that others have made and understand the importance of the coalition forces doing what they can to counter terrorism and to seek a more peaceful outcome in places such as Afghanistan. Australia is certainly a staunch ally of the U.S. in this fight against terror. I can assure you we are committed to staying so.

I thank you for the opportunity to provide the interview.