China is the only nation steadfastly articulating an A2AD strategy. This policy is closely coupled to rapid advances in weaponry and a specious declared exclusive economic zone (EEZ) projecting 200 miles from China’s coast. The Pentagon is approving and formalizing this air-sea battle plan as it girds for another cold war.

Beijing’s emerging modern military capabilities and technologies designed for A2AD create a challenge for the air-sea battle concept. Moreover, China continues to harass vessels, including U.S. Navy ships, by interfering with navigation within their declared EEZ. These are waters regarded by the international community as international waters, regions of high seas freedom.

Pentagon officials insist the air-sea battle plan is not aimed at a specific country; however, they could not cite a country other than China with deployed A2AD associated weaponry. Beijing’s technical advances encompass an anti-ship ballistic missile, new stealth fighter and China’s first aircraft carrier. Electronic and cyber warfare, integrated air and missile defenses, submarines with increasing capabilities and modern surface combatants are all aimed at enforcing China’s A2AD. All of these weapons combined could be used to create challenges to access, to keep military forces out of an area or make it very difficult to maneuver within an area, one air-sea battle office official stressed.

Even with rapid and surprising technological weapons advances, China continues to accelerate its defense spending, with a 12.7 percent increase in 2011, up from 7.5 percent in 2010. The irony is that China’s exports to the U.S. provide the lucre to continue rearming.

The basis of the U.S. air-sea battle plan is to ensure freedom of access in the global commons. This plan evolved after deployment in China of the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile with its maneuvering reentry vehicle. This weapon system is now claimed to be operational. The three U.S. services are collaborating under their respective chiefs to organize, train and equip for this new cold war – seeking jointness at a higher level, cross domain operations with integration of air and naval forces, expanding from there and creating capabilities that can be rapidly fielded.

The air-sea battle organization represents change. Their priority is to network and integrate U.S. forces more tightly, to allow them to remain in a very challenging and complex A2AD environment without being forced to move out of the area, and to engage if necessary. Combatant commanders, in turn, will use this air-sea battle concept to shape their forces to operate with an A2AD environment. This new air-sea battle organization, with approximately 15 officials assigned, has immediate access to major fleet and field commands.

Another decades-long new cold war could play itself out in the Pacific. A recent example of Beijing’s A2AD strategy and heavy-handedness involves China’s claim to oil-rich areas of the South China Sea. During the Bali summit, Manmohan Singh, India’s prime minister, informed his Chinese counterpart that his country intended to continue commercial oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea. India and Vietnam are jointly exploring in areas off the contested Spratly Islands. China’s bellicose response contained a blunt warning to India not to challenge or violate China’s control.

Realists know there is little doubt that China’s A2AD strategy helps enforce its growing power and influence throughout the Pacific Rim. And Beijing rapidly is harnessing its growing influence to reshape international rules and institutions to serve its own purposes. The question of how America and its allies respond to China’s military modernization efforts and its A2AD strategy is of particular importance. Appeasing a bully never works.

The Air Force and the Marine Corps now join the U.S. Navy, already developing weapons to counter anti-ship missiles. President Obama also announced during a mid-November visit to Australia new plans to deploy 2,500 leathernecks “down under,” along with increasing bomber flights and aircraft carrier port visits. Designed to bolster alliances in Asia, China reacted to Obama’s move by claiming an increase in tensions and that the U.S. is seeking to encircle the People’s Republic. Meanwhile, Singapore and Vietnam are offering basing to U.S. warships.

Bubbling just beneath the surface is the potential for military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or another issue. Some observers consider this an unlikely scenario, in part, because of U.S.-Chinese economic linkages. Nevertheless, the U.S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific is likely to influence day-to-day challenges faced by other Pacific nations.

Washington and Beijing are still at loggerheads over diplomatic, economic and military activities in the Pacific. President Obama expressed his concerns during the Bali Asian leader’s summit. Recent tensions are focused on territorial disputes between Beijing and its neighbors in the South China Sea. Obama told China’s leader that the United States will protect freedom of navigation, the free trade movement and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

While the U.S. military has been preoccupied with jihadist terrorism and rogue states, China’s military has been in the ascendancy. Now, the reality of the situation mandates quick U.S. reaction. This situation, while risky, also requires an open realization that a new bamboo curtain is descending along the Pacific Rim – from the Hawaiian Islands to Taiwan, to the Philippines, to Borneo, to New Guinea and to Australia.

As this new Asian-centered world order drama plays out, the U.S. military pledges an assertive presence, a show of force to assuage China’s A2AD strategy by being prepared to respond and initiate whatever action is required to ensure a strong U.S. presence. Every element of American power will be used to ensure prosperity and freedom in the region.

Kremer took time before an SM-3 IB missile flight test in Hawaii to speak to Defense senior writer Clarence A. Robinson, Jr. His responses address both ship- and land-based ballistic missile defenses in Europe and Southeast Asia.

Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.: The U.S. Navy successfully tested its Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system with an upgraded radar coupled to a SM-3 Block IA interceptor. What is the significance of this test?

Wesley D. Kremer: You’re referring to our last test of the SM-3 Block IA missile launch that took place in April. This test involved the forward basing of the AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar located on Wake Island, and it demonstrated the SM-3 Block IA’s ability to successfully engage an intermediate-range ballistic missile [IRBM] in what is referred to as launch on remote. A Raytheon AN/TPY-2 radar, which is not organic to the Aegis weapons system, successfully tracked the target as it rose above the horizon from its launch site on Kwajalein Atoll, relaying that information through the command, control, battle management, and communications system to a remote Aegis ship in the Pacific. The Aegis system computed a firing solution and forwarded the information to the Block IA missile and initiated the launch sequence. Leveraging off-board sensors, the SM-3 Block IA engaged and destroyed the IRBM. It was the 19th successful intercept for the SM-3 missile.

How does this success relate to the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) in protecting the continent?

The significance is that the engage-on-remote demonstration is representative of the first phase of Europe’s Phased Adaptive Approach to ballistic-missile defense. A proven missile interceptor is made even more capable through sensor netting, demonstrating that a forward-based X-Band radar can successfully provide a cue with targeting accuracy and pass that information to the shooter, in this case an Aegis ship operating in the region as sea-based BMD. This test confirms the Phase I approach of defending against short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. Yes, we took down an intermediate-range ballistic missile but [that] is actually much more of an advanced threat than the EPAA’s Phase I requires.

The EPAA architecture envisions initial sea-basing this year with SM-3 interceptors as the key to the first phase of Europe’s missile defense. Are there already Aegis ships on station in the area?

Yes, in March of this year, the guided missile cruiser USS Monterey [CG 61] deployed as the first official sea-based BMD capability as part of the EPAA. This Aegis ship is armed with SM-3 Block IA missiles.

The EPAA also envisions land-based Aegis radar and battle management components along with an even more capable SM-3 Block IB by 2015. What is the status of this development effort?

The significance of the Block IB missile is that it is an evolution of the proven Block IA. The IB provides three new features: a two-color infrared seeker, an advanced signal processor, and a throttleable divert and attitude control system. The first two technical advances provide better target discrimination against more complex and advanced threats anticipated in the future.

The throttleable control mechanism for the Kinetic Kill Vehicle [KKV] provides increased maneuverability, managing thrust and acceleration in the final phase as the KKV homes on the target.

There is an ongoing debate in two camps about how to best accomplish target discrimination. An X-band and an S-band radar along with a radar suite controller is intended to provide unprecedented situational awareness to easily detect, track, and engage ballistic missiles in high-clutter environments. The X-Band radar provides higher resolution than S-Band radar, as an example, and the Block IB KKV provides multiple bands in the infrared. There are also space-based sensors Raytheon builds that are part of the equation.

In my opinion, the combination of all of these sensors will be necessary for discrimination when advanced countermeasures emerge. Our company also is building airborne infrared sensors for use on the Predator and Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles for missile defense missions.

Additionally, there is a sea-based floating X-band radar deployed in the Pacific with outstanding discrimination, and early warning radars at locations such as Alaska and Cape Cod, among others.

[Editor’s note: In an early September test from the U.S. Navy cruiser USS Lake Erie, the SM-3 Block IB failed to intercept a short-range ballistic missile target launched from Kauai, Hawaii. The Missile Defense Agency [MDA] is investigating the cause of the failure of the first IB intercept test. However, the MDA plans to buy more than 300 SM-3 Block IB missiles over the next five years. The Block IB missile is scheduled for an initial operational capability in 2013 and to be available for full operations in 2015.]

When will follow-on improvements to the SM-3 Block IA enable engagements of longer-range, faster-flying ballistic missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)?

Upgrades to the Block IA missiles are obviously those of Block IB, which extend the range. There is also a Block IIA missile that involves a collaborative development program with Japan and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. None of these SM-3s, however, are designed to go against ICBMs. That is the goal of the EPAA Phase 4, which is now in concept development. We are one of three contractors competing for what is called SM-3 Block IIB.

This concept development is an interesting challenge, involving not only the interceptor missile but also the sensors and command, control, battle management, and communications system in a robust and balanced architecture to address ICBM threats in the 2020-plus time frame.

In addition to your company’s AN/TPY-2 radar-supported launch-on-remote demonstration with the SM-3 Block IA, there have been 22 of 27 successful engagements at sea since 2002. Besides launch on remote, which you addressed, what does the term “engage on remote,” which some call the Holy Grail of BMD, mean?

Holy Grail is an interesting term. SM-3 interceptor missiles are no longer constrained by the range of the sea-based Aegis radar, with either launch on remote or engage on remote. This approach leverages the strengths of the sensors, radars, and interceptor components.

We at Raytheon build the sensors, the radar, and the interceptors. Because of that we are uniquely positioned to observe how all three elements work best together. Nevertheless, you need very strong individual components. But the key to successful missile defense does not rest in these individual mechanisms. You must maximize the radars, sensors, and interceptors synergistically to take out the threat at the earliest possible moment in its trajectory.

The IRBM engagement capability is defined in the EPAA Phase 3 target set in the 2018 time frame, and we clearly demonstrated the viability of a forward-based sensor to engage on remote against an IRBM. This shows the robustness of the system and adaptability, the cornerstone of the phased adaptive approach. Engage on remote expands the battlespace. Having a forward-based sensor enables seeing well beyond the radar capability of the Aegis system alone, or with the forward-based X-Band radar alone. Detecting the target sooner enables computing a firing control solution more rapidly, providing an earlier opportunity for the interceptor to engage.

With engage on remote, the entire engagement can be successfully accomplished without the shooter ever seeing the threat. This capability compresses the engagement timeline, further extending the range. This really becomes key with the SM-3 Block IIA missile, where you have a larger round with much longer kinematics that can far outfly organic sensors.

Having engage on remote is part of the EPAA Phase 3, along with a radar site in Romania by 2015 and a second land-based site in Poland in 2018.

The growing demand for missile defense-capable ships will outpace the surface fleet’s ability to provide vessels through 2018, according to the Navy. The sea service anticipates having 94 BMD-capable ships by 2024. The global proliferation of land-attack and anti-ship ballistic missiles underpins this requirement. What can European allies do to augment missile defense as demands continue to grow?

We are seeing a lot of recent activity in Europe as nations accept the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s [NATO’s] decision for a territorial missile defense role in the aftermath of the Lisbon Summit last year. We have been working with the allies to help them share the responsibility for missile defense. European nations have tremendous naval platforms capable of all aspects of BMD. That’s why we’re involved in NATO discussions regarding an SM-3 interceptor pool. It makes complete sense.

Raytheon, as an example, has invested company funding in developing a dual-band data link. This new data link will allow European ships to communicate with the SM-3 family, either through S-Band, as they currently do, or X-Band radars. The data link will enable NATO ships with the proper radar capability to carry SM-3s on board. In early 2010, NATO acquired the first phase of an initial capability to protect alliance forces against missile threats.

At the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO’s leaders decided to develop a missile defense capability to pursue its core task of collective defense. They decided that the scope of the current Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense [ALTBMD] programs’ command, control, and communication capabilities architecture would be expanded to encompass European populations and territory.

As one example, Turkey has agreed to deploy an early-warning radar system by the end of the year as part of NATO’s missile defense program for Europe. It is aimed at countering the threat of missile attacks from Iran. There is also NATO agreement for its ships to communicate with SM-3 BMD missiles. There is an ongoing dialogue of using the SM-3 Block IIA system in a collaborative effort as we do with Japan. We are certainly looking for opportunities in the EPAA Phase 4 architecture circa 2020 by partnering with European industry.

Are there any operational BMD assets in Europe? Are there European phased-array radar ships that could be used to implement missile defense with SM-3s? Which nations operate these assets?

There are ships from European nations that could be modified. There are four in the Netherlands, three in Germany, and three in Denmark, and this is where our attention is focused now. These ships could use the dual-band data link and be equipped with SM-3s and other modifications to become ready as sea-based missile defense assets. This is a great opportunity to combine world-class European-developed naval sensors and combat systems with the SM-3. Making the most of existing European and U.S. investments provides more territorial missile defense capability at lower cost and sooner than any other available upper-tier option. I really view the data link as the ultimate enabler of networked ballistic-missile defense intercept capability. This is a perfect example of how NATO can save money and increase capability by pooling and sharing. Plus, European ships can take on the additional upper-tier mission, while maintaining their full multi-role capabilities. That’s important.

Last year, we spoke with Rear Adm. Frank C. Pandolfe, USN, for Defense. He is the Navy’s director, Surface Warfare Division, or N86. The admiral mentioned that the Aegis combat system would be upgraded with a dual-band advanced air and missile defense radar. What is the difference between this and the dual-band data link you mentioned?

The dual-band data link is a communications mechanism. What Adm. Pandolfe was talking about is actually a dual-band fire-control radar that is in the early stages of competition. It would provide both X-Band and S-Band radar for future Aegis ships, an important sea-based BMD evolution.

Thus far, we have concentrated on Europe; however, an even more serious missile threat is emerging, and much faster, in China and North Korea. Can the same integrated BMD approach in Europe be applied to China’s land-mobile DF-21D and DF-31 ballistic-missile threats?

The EPAA could be applied to BMD operations in Asia. The sea-based sensors, space-based assets, and forward-deployed land-based sensors apply to other geographies. The key asset is the flexibility that enables a mobile system to operate anywhere in the world where U.S. or allied interests are threatened by ballistic missiles.

Raytheon’s dual-band data link allows the expansion of users around the world, pointing toward the Aegis ashore concept, with land-based interceptors and sensors as key elements. An Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex in Hawaii already is engaged in expanding the land-basing concept.

What is next for Raytheon’s SM-3 program?

We are focusing on production deliveries of the important BMD assets to the fleet – this includes bringing the SM-3 Block IB into production – and on the Block IIA with Japan. The IIA offers the evolutionary approach to increasing capability against threats in the 2018 era. We are 90 days ahead of schedule with deliveries of 130 SM-3 Block IA missiles to the U.S. and its allies. As soon as we deliver a missile, it is deployed. The Block IIA program finds the Japanese building new second- and third-stage rocket motors, which expand from 13.5 inches in diameter to a full 21-inch propulsion stack, greatly increasing range and the engagement envelope.

Raytheon also builds the sensors for the Space Tracking and Surveillance System [STSS], which has successfully completed on-orbit testing. The STSS consists of two satellites in low-Earth orbit that carry sensor payloads to detect cold objects such as ballistic missile re-entry vehicles in space for precise tracking, from launch to re-entry. This satellite system relays the necessary cueing data to missile interceptors before a warhead reaches friendly territory. Providing both the sensors and the interceptor missiles [allows] Raytheon to work with the government and U.S. allies to optimize solutions that are both flexible and robust for the future.

Pace recently took time for a wide-ranging interview with Defense senior writer Clarence A. Robinson, Jr. His responses delve into today’s UAVs and future applications of unmanned aircraft.

Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.: You were at Leading Systems and then GA-ASI from the beginning. The Predator and its variants are a real success story. It seems the attitude has been “if you build it, they will come,” with the company designing and producing a medium-altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial platform with enormous growth potential, and then making it available to the government. Did this approach greatly reduce the development and production cycles and therefore costs?

Frank W. Pace: A lot of what happened was having the right system at the right time. We received the initial Predator contract in 1994 and made the aircraft available to the customer in 1995, flying it in theater 18 months after contract award. While Predator was successfully deployed and operational, little attention was directed at this unmanned platform until the September 2001 terrorist attacks. After 9/11, Predator demands and growth were explosive, as the company went from 500 to 5,000 employees, keeping pace with production orders. It almost immediately became obvious that Predator was the aircraft of choice for asymmetric warfare, doing what it does best – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance [ISR] in real-time. It also grew into other roles, but always with ISR functions foremost.

When General Atomics acquired Leading Systems and its Amber/GNAT aircraft, what did that entail in terms of people and aircraft? Also, Turkey had bought GNAT 750s. Had those aircraft already been delivered prior to the Leading Systems acquisition?

GA never really acquired Leading Systems. Instead, it acquired its assets – jigs, tooling, airframes – and brought over some 10 people from Leading Systems to form the nucleus of Aeronautical Systems. I was one of those people.

GA-ASI ended up with six GNAT 750s in various stages of build-up. Two UAVs were ready to fly and the others were in lesser levels of assembly, mostly fuselages without installed avionics or engines. The GNAT 750-45 became the Predator. The Turkish air force operated with six GNAT 750s and 16 improved GNAT variants, with some still in service.

The GNAT 750-45 that became Predator A and its larger, more powerful ground attack Predator B Reaper brother have matured as aerial platforms and figured prominently in headlines during combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Serbia, Yemen, Libya, and Somalia. What are the cumulative flight hours for these vehicles?

Predators have flown more than 1.5 million flight hours as of late July 2011. Installing a satellite communications antenna initially atop a GNAT 750 and then into Predator’s nose really changed the whole ballgame, creating a true military revolution for remotely piloted vehicles.

UAVs could now loiter for days over a battlefield transmitting imagery, while controlled from thousands of miles away.

What lessons have been learned that may have led to some Predator modifications, if any?

Lessons learned are almost too many to tally. The Rotax 582 engine powered the GNAT 750. This is a 64-horsepower, two-stroke, two-cylinder, rotary intake valve, liquid-cooled, gear reduction-drive engine. It was initially designed for use on light sport and ultra light aircraft. We then installed the Rotax 912 engine in the GNAT 750. Predator also had the 912; however, it was not turbo charged. This engine uses air-cooled cylinders with water-cooled heads and a gearbox to reduce the engine’s relative high shaft speed to a lower speed for the propeller. Later, we installed the Rotax 914, a turbo-charged, four-cylinder, horizontally opposed aircraft engine with air-cooled cylinders and water-cooled cylinder heads. Installation of the 914 was the single biggest change we made, along with a much more efficient propeller. This system provided 3 kilowatts of power and was non-redundant. We now have a redundant system on Predator A that offers 5 kilowatts of power.

What other refinements took place in an emerging Predator platform?

Servo actuators, especially in the tail assembly, had to be replaced about every 100 flight hours. The servos are now up to 400 flight hours without replacement. The tail section was also modified, reducing vibration as the propeller went by. Less vibration also helped increase servo mean time between failures and thus flight hours. The mission readiness rate for the fleet is at 90 percent.

Have there been other significant changes to the unmanned aircraft system?

We have continually improved the ground control station [GCS] over time. Display screens have been added to better tie the aircrew in with the outside world while flying Predator, instead of only a narrow-view aircraft cockpit with instruments and sensor displays. In addition to the pilot, a sensor operator flies missions that enable the aircraft to fly up to 400 nautical miles and loiter over the target area for up to 14 hours before returning to base.

There are two versions of a new Predator cockpit. The Block 30 version will be available in about a year. This new cockpit will integrate displays and sensor systems into a vastly improved form, fit, and function, with modest human-machine interface improvements. A more advanced Block 50 version, to be fielded in 2014, will have an all-new graphical user interface, provide touch screens, surround situational awareness, new software, and state-of-the-art graphics.

Are you using the same logic for the ground control station as with the remotely piloted vehicle: you build it with huge growth potential knowing customers will come and buy it?

There is an element of that with the Block 30 GCS. GA-ASI built it up, showing it to customers, but without all the technical engineering drawings and specifications to take it into production. We built the prototype with our own money. We actually worked on the Block 50 for three years using internal research and development funds; however, the customer offers a lot of very helpful GCS input. We never intended to take it all the way to final product on our own. The first half of the Block 30 we funded ourselves. Approximately the first one-third of the Block 50 was completed with company funding.

How do these GCS improvements affect the use by the various services?

The Army operates the Gray Eagle GCS in a different manner. With their operational concept, the pilot, who is not necessarily a rated aviator, pushes a button to take off and a button to land. These functions are preprogrammed into the air vehicle. During flight, the GCS crew can either fly programmed waypoints or control the aircraft using the stick.

The Army uses a single design Gray Eagle GCS manufactured for GA-ASI by AAI, Hunt Valley, Md. The Air Force has all the options: Their aircrews either can use the stick and throttle or fly programmed waypoints. Typically, when engaging targets with weapons, the Air Force likes the flexibility of having positive control of the system rather than automated preprogrammed maneuvers.

What are major differences between the Army’s Gray Eagle version of Predator and Predators A and B?

In a competitive program, the Army selected Gray Eagle in August 2005. This UAV is more capable than the Predator A but less capable than Predator B Reaper. A $214 million system development and demonstration contract to GA-ASI set the stage for procurement of 11 Gray Eagle systems, each with 12 airplanes and five ground control stations.

Operational in 2009, the Army integrated the Hellfire missile system within a year, weaponizing four aircraft and deploying them to Afghanistan. Gray Eagle operates at more than 30 hours with speeds greater than 135 knots and up to 29,000 feet. A more reliable airplane, this UAV also uses heavy diesel fuel that can be found on the battlefield for use with Army vehicles, such as the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, as opposed to 100-octane aviation gas. The Predator A is 105 horsepower and the Gray Eagle engine generates 160 horsepower. The Gray Eagle carries four Hellfire missiles or 600 pounds of payload. Hellfire is the Army’s [munition] of choice.

How do the applications of the Army platform differ from the Air Force Predator/Reaper?

The aircraft is equipped with a synthetic aperture radar/ground moving target indicator. This long-range, long-dwell-time UAV is designed for operational control by Army field commanders. Its expansive mission set includes, but is not limited to, wide area ISR and improvised explosive device [IED] detection and defeat, close air support, communications relay, and weapons delivery missions. Gray Eagle is the largest size UAV that could be boxed and placed on a trailer for movement around the battlefield, meeting Army mobility requirements. The aircraft needs a runway but can take off and land from cleared roadways.

What is the production and delivery status of Gray Eagle?

GA-ASI is in the middle of building low-rate initial production aircraft. The first 17 UAVs were built under the original contract and another eight were procured. We have delivered almost 40 airplanes to the Army. As an aside, the Air Force has halted Predator A production and we are approximately a quarter of the way through the Predator B production run. The Air Force anticipates buying additional Reapers for another five years.

Is it true that the Army intends to operate Gray Eagle with non-rated personnel using a track ball system much like a video game rather than a stick and rudder arrangement? Please discuss in detail.

Army non-pilot personnel will fly the Gray Eagle. However, they receive extensive training, not only to fly the UAV and control sensors and weapon systems, but how to operate during an Instrument Flight Rules [IFR] environment to meet strict Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] standards. You can’t just take a soldier who carries a rifle and put him or her in the GCS to fly a Gray Eagle. The training is comprehensive.

Have Predator/Reapers been sold to allied nations that also operate the unmanned aerial systems as part of NATO forces in Afghanistan? If so, are there any changes to the flight vehicles to meet foreign requirements? How many hours have these aerial vehicles flown in combat?

Italy procured both Predator As and Bs and the United Kingdom operates only Predator Bs. Both nations are flying the aircraft in combat in Southwest Asia. State Department foreign military sales regulations have precluded deliveries to other nations. Tens of thousands of flight hours have been accumulated with Predator A and B by both Italy and England. A different radio was installed on Italy’s Predator.

Is it true that in Iraq a Predator armed with Stinger air defense missiles engaged an Iraqi MiG-25 in aerial combat, firing at the Foxbat? Please describe the engagement and the outcome.

This is accurate. There was some tit for tat going on in Iraq. Several days earlier, the Predator GCS crew spotted an Iraqi MiG aircraft in the area. Afterward, the Predator was armed with Stinger missiles, not an optimum weapon for air-to-air combat; however, they fit on the aircraft and could be launched in self-defense. We are pretty certain the Iraqi MiG-25 was detected before the Foxbat pilot saw the Predator. The problem is that the Stinger didn’t have sufficient range or closing speed and the Iraqi aircraft had much better missiles. The MiG-25 carries two radar-guided AA-6 Acrid and two infrared-guided R-40T missiles. We saw the missile coming and it struck the Predator A. If we had the Predator B and perhaps a better missile system, we believe we could handle our own in that scenario.

The Foxbat was still out of Stinger’s range when [the] Predator fired but we thought we would give it a try anyway. The whole engagement was recorded and has been studied for the enemy’s concept of operations and for lessons learned.

Predator can only carry 125 pounds on each of two hard points. However, the Predator B can carry a total of 3,000 pounds of weapons. A typical load for the Reaper is two 500-pound bombs and four Hellfire missiles. The B could accommodate radar-guided air-to-air missiles, if required. Nevertheless, extensive modifications would be necessary.

Amber/Predator at one point was to be designed for launch from a torpedo tube of a submarine. What changed this concept?

Amber, not Predator, was initially designed for launch in a canister from a box launcher to self-deploy, simultaneously providing many UAVs for ISR over wide areas of a battlefield. Batteries would fire Ambers from box launchers, filling the sky with 20 to 30 aircraft. This aerial platform also could be launched in a canister from a submarine’s torpedo tube. Amber’s design had provisions for a pivoting wing mounted on a pedestal atop the fuselage. The tail and propeller blades also folded to fit inside a canister. This was an early concept of a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [DARPA] program. This canister design was never flown. Predator is more like the GNAT 750, with wings mounted on the fuselage. There was never consideration of Predator being fired from a torpedo tube or box launcher.

Is it true that Predator, flying from a runway, conducted trials at sea with a submarine, scouting well ahead of the boat and relaying intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information to a communications buoy tethered to the submarine?

Yes, we did some demonstrations working with a submarine. Communications transmissions went directly to the submarine’s mast-mounted antenna, not via a communications buoy.

With a new jet engine propulsion system and the Avenger/Sea Avenger name, will this aircraft assume missions such as fleet air defense, with an arresting-gear-capable maritime version, to protect carrier battle groups?

The Navy has a new competitive UAV class program. It keeps being delayed; however, we are expecting a request for proposal in early 2012. In the meanwhile, the Navy issued a Broad Agency Announcement and funded study contracts to four companies, each for $500,000. GA-ASI received a contract, along with Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing. These are likely to be the same competitors once the RFP [request for proposal] is issued.

The Sea Avenger requires a significant modification to the aircraft, not just making it arresting-gear capable. The g loads exerted on the aircraft for carrier flight-deck landing and takeoff make it a whole different situation. The underside of the aircraft must be beefed up. Once capable of carrier flight operations, the concept is for the Sea Avenger to fly ISR and air defense missions. The aircraft will likely need electronic countermeasures and stealth-like capabilities for survivability, much different than the UAVs we have delivered to this point.

What other changes were made in configuring the Avenger? Could it become an unmanned dog-fighting combat aircraft?

Our part of the fleet air defense mission could be to locate incoming hostile aircraft and alert the fleet. Other fighter aircraft would engage in dog fighting – those spotted on the carrier deck specifically designed for that mission. Dog-fighting UAVs are not likely until well into the future, with most of the agility and nimbleness designed into air-to-air missiles.

Naval Air Systems Command appears keen on developing an unmanned carrier-launched strike UAV. The Navy has always been prone to do business with contractors who have carrier aircraft design and production experience. Are you planning to add teammates?

GA-ASI is assembling a team. I cannot say yet who the team members might be since we are still in competition. We will have three or four major teammates and several minor ones. The major teammates will include companies that have been involved in developing carrier-based aircraft. We are studying carrier operations with a UAV and how this might affect onboard procedures. We have been involved in discussions with the Navy about ways to handle the UAV on the flight deck, whether to have the deck crew remotely steer the aircraft into position or use a tug to move it into place on the catapult, as an example. The longer the program RFP is delayed, the greater the challenge. A lot of testing is planned at Lakehurst, N.J., with the goal of having an operational aircraft by 2018.

The carrier-based UAV development and procurement looks to be the opposite of GA-ASI’s swift approach to designing and building unmanned aircraft. This program appears to be more mainstream procurement, which takes longer and drives the price up. Is that the case?

That is correct. Nonetheless, it’s nothing we don’t believe we can conquer on our own. The safety aspects of flying from a carrier deck preclude a lot of shortcuts. It is imperative that, in general, we make it safe to operate unmanned aircraft from a ship. This is especially the case when you must land an unmanned aircraft within several feet of sailors on the deck. You simply cannot shortchange a lot of the testing before operating on a carrier with all the people on the ship, particularly with other aircraft, weapons and refueling systems nearby. The flight-testing and safety aspects must be strictly incorporated.

Are there plans for in-flight refueling to integrate the persistence and flexibility of a UAV into a carrier air wing?

At one point, the Navy wanted to fly off the carrier with a UAV in-flight refueling capability for long-endurance missions. The overall requirement varied from something like 11 to 14 hours to 18 to 20 hours flight time. The requirement will probably be to operate without tanking; however, the Navy may still desire a tanking capability to meet mission needs.

Whatever is decided, our plan is to have Sea Avenger remain on station for 18 to 20 hours without being tanked. We believe this feature is really important for the Navy. Tanker aircraft are expensive and there are not a lot of them available to the fleet. They should remain available when they are needed for other priority missions with manned airplanes.

Are there other versions of the Predator in use by the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection? If so, what are the differences, if any, in the flight vehicles or sensor systems?

The Homeland Security applications and users are combined and we deliver Predator B aircraft to Customs and Border Protection. This version has been modified to carry an under-slung SeaVue surface search radar system. The UAV also is equipped with an Automatic Identification System [AIS] similar to Identification Friend or Foe [IFF], to interrogate ships and identify them as friendly, if indeed they are. If a vessel is pinged and doesn’t respond, either they are bad guys or their AIS system is broken. Either way, the boat must be checked out. There is also an added backup satellite data link, to better satisfy the FAA’s regulations when flying over U.S. territory. This aircraft uses two different types of satellite data links, but is not armed. It could, however, be armed, if required.

This article was first published in Defense: Fall 2011 Edition.

Keeping pace with this runaway digital locomotive requires solid protection for efficient access, movement, and data integrity. Changing the way populations work, live, learn, and play, the ubiquitous Web is the most valuable strategic asset in a dynamic era of communications and information technology (IT).

Today’s network places more than 2.5 billion global users, one-third of the world’s population, online. Indeed, more than 240 million Americans, or 77 percent of the U.S. population, routinely employ the Internet. One company’s unique approach in harnessing cybersecurity uses the network’s own tools to help provide protection, according to Brad Boston, Cisco’s senior vice president, Global Government Solutions and Corporate Security Programs. “We harness the network to protect the devices such as routers, servers, and handhelds that connect to it – whatever can be attached.”

Prevalent across governments, militaries, and industries, Cisco is one major corporation that clearly understands proliferation risks and the paramount necessity of trusted networks. This IT company operates with nearly 70,000 employees in 92 countries, and generates approximately $40 billion in annual revenues.

Cisco's Senior Vice President Brad Boston observes the flow of information inside the company's Network Emergency Response Vehicle (NERV). Fully operational within 15 minutes during crises, the self-contained vehicle uses on-board power and communicates during emergencies via an Internet Protocol network. Photo courtesy of Clarence A. Robinson Jr.

“Cisco Systems constantly monitors and manages Internet activity. We have outstanding relationships with others in the IT industry, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies that respond to cyber incidents,” Boston said. “We collaborate and share what we learn about cyber threats and how to thwart them. One of the basics is that every organization owns critical infrastructure elements, not just government agencies. Critical infrastructure in the United States mostly involves the private sector. The key to network protection is for each organization to understand the threats, take them seriously, and focus on appropriate levels of security and defense.

“Too many organizations focus on viruses and firewalls, which is a simplistic approach. While these are absolutely necessary, today’s threats transcend conventional protection by an order of magnitude, mandating an understanding of the nature of the threats. Most organizations, especially in industry, are woefully under invested to defend against these threats,” Boston said. “A public-private partnership is necessary to deal with today’s threats. A big challenge involves legislation and title authorities established years ago that do not dovetail with the dynamic nature of evolving threats. Rushing legislation through, however, without understanding the outcome of proposed rules can lead to unintended consequences.”

“Some legislation proposals call for U.S. government agencies and companies owning and operating elements of critical infrastructure to use only certified security devices. However, today’s certification processes often take longer than the life cycle of the products involved. You may end up with certified devices that are a generation or two old while threats will have changed, providing a Maginot Line of cyber defense,” Boston said. “There must be a frank dialogue between federal agencies, lawmakers, and industry on proper cyber defense legislative steps.”

Boston’s responsibilities encompass advising government customers on business practices and technology solutions to achieve and enhance their mission goals. Dedicated Cisco teams address challenges faced by global defense, space, and security agencies. With a computer science degree from the University of Illinois, his charter also encompasses Cisco’s corporate security office. Boston focuses on ensuring the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of critical information and computing assets.

Cisco tends to dominate the Internet Protocol (IP) market with networking equipment such as switches and routers to direct data, voice, and video. Remote access servers, IP telephony, Internet conferencing, and optical components are some of this company’s product portfolio.

Cisco operates a security business unit; however, protecting networks and attached devices far transcends any one corporate element, Boston said. The company’s core infrastructure footprint across the federal government exceeds traditional security products. These technologies facilitate cyber defense capabilities, he added. “Realistically, all of our technologies should contribute to meeting cybersecurity challenges. Leveraging intrinsic features inside our core infrastructure does not always involve things we sell per se, such as security products, but rather myriad capabilities that make an agency or entity safer.”

Boston pointed out Cisco’s global ad hoc networking capability also functions with multiple security tools. “Together with the folks from the [General Dynamics] Warfighter Information Network Tactical [WIN-T], Cisco Systems is providing radio routing, which allows us to form a mesh network in areas where no infrastructure exists. Radio routers discover each other and form the network. The topology of this network changes as the radios move in relation to one another,” he said.

WIN-T is the Army’s high-speed, high-capacity backbone communications network, linking warfighters on the battlefield with the Global Information Grid. This network introduces mobile, self-configuring, self-healing functions using satellite on-the-move capabilities. Robust network management high-bandwidth radio systems keep mobile forces connected, communicating, and synchronized. “A radio awareness routing interface provides constant information concerning link quality. This feature enables intelligent decisions about how traffic should be routed over which links, based on quality of underlying radio transmissions,” Boston said.

West Point cadets tested their cyber defense skills against veteran hackers from the National Security Agency and emerged victorious. The three-day 2011 Cyber Defense Exercise concluded April 22, 2011, giving the U.S. Military Academy its sixth win. U.S. Army photo by Mike Strasser, West Point Public Affairs

“We are taking a similar approach with our IP Routing in Space [IRIS] initiative, porting radio-aware routing to a hardware platform built for space. Now we have the capability to route communications across multiple satellite transponders and simultaneously have the transmitting modem provide information on underlying radio link quality,” Boston said. “WIN-T combined with IRIS creates for the first time a ‘space to mud’ architecture based on an IP network. So, an aircraft flying into a theater of operations, as an example, can join the network and become an integral partner with ground forces. Those units may not have line-of-sight communications with one another and the aircraft completes that link.”

Cisco is well positioned to support the ever-increasing mobile networking demands of the tactical warfighter through a wide variety of products and solution sets, Boston said. “We understand the need for tailorable networks that can be quickly configured to support weight and size requirements as the mission dictates. The primary support is in secure switching and routing areas; however, wireless content delivery, and especially converged data, voice, and video, can be major network enablers in the WIN-T program.”

Cybersecurity strategy over the past six months also enabled Cisco to better align various certification and accreditation activities with the federal government through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This agency works with industry to develop and apply technology, measurements, and standards. The company has actually mapped its solutions portfolio directly to NIST guidelines using the same language that government customers use for cybersecurity and IT operations. Mapping NIST controls to Cisco security solutions assures Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) compliance, Boston explained.

“The primary incentive for FISMA compliance is to identify the people, systems, and processes an agency needs to achieve business objectives. Customers talk about boundary defense, so we created boundary defense solutions. Organizations talk about identity and access to maintain a secure state, so we have an identity and access solution. All of these solutions adhere to FISMA implementation. Some 15 solution sets are available and beneath each rides trust, visibility, and resilience. Cisco views cybersecurity as holistic and goes beyond the scope of any one internal business unit to resolve problems. Instead, solutions involve a collective set of people, processes, and technologies,” Boston said.

“As part of cybersecurity initiatives, everyone must use basic hygiene in keeping the network clean through practices that promote and preserve the entire data infrastructure,” said Boston. This approach helps reduce problems whenever they occur, making it easier to quickly spot and overcome difficulties. Hygiene overcomes negative interactions between subsystems, which can snowball. Keeping the network clean forestalls minor problems from becoming major ones, he added.

Cyber criminals seek to attach botnets to personal computers or steal information as it traverses the network. A botnet is a network of compromised machines that can be remotely controlled by an attacker. Up to thousands of machines linked together can pose serious threats. A collection of infected computers, or bots, is taken over by bot herders to perform malicious tasks or functions. “Cyber criminals may also plant false information in the network. When we focus on protecting the network, we actually have to protect all the devices that attach,” said Boston, who previously served as Cisco’s chief information officer.

There are a number of tools in the network that can look for traffic, that can potentially compromise endpoints or steal information, Boston said. Cisco has built capabilities into firewalls, such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), as an example. As a packet passes an inspection point, DPI searches for protocol non-compliance, viruses, spam, or intrusions. Pre-defined criteria determine what actions to take with the packet. Advanced network management, user services, and security functions result from DPI. Intrusion detection and prevention are functions within DPI that combine with traditional state-of-the-art firewalls.

“Another technique involves profiling traffic and understanding what is normal within the network by using tools that inform when something out of the norm occurs. This technology allows reactive defenses, determining whether the traffic is legitimate or bogus and thus immediately discarded,” Boston said. “There are a number of defenses that can be used on the network, such as anti-virus tools and others, that must be installed at the endpoints of the network. One of the things we often find is that our customers, including companies, enterprises, and government organizations, have far more defensive capabilities at their disposal than they realize or routinely use,” he added.

“Arguably, too much attention focuses on firewalls and anti-virus techniques. However, a lot of organizations, we discovered, don’t even do a very good job at these basics. Additional tools have often been acquired or are part of the network infrastructure, a suite of tools that come with computer software,” Boston said. “We help customers better understand how to use these tools correctly to improve their defenses – to monitor traffic traversing the network and to spot anomalies. Many organizations look at what is coming into their network from the Internet, looking for bad traffic.

“Cisco, nonetheless, learned several years ago that you also must scrutinize traffic leaving your network. This can be a very good indication that something within the network has been compromised and is launching attacks outbound,” Boston said. “Profiling traffic inside the network is equally important,” he continued, “because something within may have become infected and could be attacking the network internally. Many companies fail to observe outbound and internal network traffic security, relying instead on incoming data. This approach can be self-defeating.”

Malware, which can be delivered into a network through a variety of methods, involves programs with code, scripts, active content, and other software designed to disrupt or deny operations. Malware gathers information leading to loss of privacy or exploitation, gaining unauthorized access to system resources, and other abusive behavior. Personal computers (PCs) can be compromised via a connection over the Web by downloading an infected file via a corrupted email, through a Universal Serial Bus (USB) plug-in, a connection to a smart phone, or a bad compact disk. “There hasn’t been much focus in the industry over how the malware payloads reach their targeted systems, how they insert themselves, and steps to close these avenues of approach. Industry needs to take greater action in this area,” Boston said.

Microsoft® has taken a more aggressive approach to improving security of its newer Windows® products, making it more difficult for scammers to effectively infiltrate, Boston said. Cyber criminals have therefore moved on to other operating systems, applications, software services, and devices such as smart phones, iPads®, and iPods®, which are all experiencing increases in exploitation. Worldwide adaptation of mobile devices opens new avenues for scammers’ exploitation.

Supporting and maintaining its products, Cisco focuses on various methods cyber criminals could use to install malware on the network. Inserting malware from a remote site has become relatively easy for criminals because the computing industry built software to allow less time-consuming and more cost-effective remote maintenance and support to download fixes, Boston said.

Tools that are part of Cisco’s basic router and switch technologies enable network traffic monitoring. The company’s NetFlow is an example of a software feature that provides a key set of services for IP applications, including network traffic accounting, planning, security, and denial of service monitoring. NetFlow provides valuable information about network users and applications, peak usage times, and traffic routing, Boston said. “This is a very powerful tool that helps to identify what is transpiring in the network. Taking the initiative, Cisco also cobbled together other tools provided by specialty companies to provide an important suite of tools for managing the constant overview of network traffic.”

Several years ago, Cisco acquired a company with an endpoint intrusion prevention system. This rule-based software examines system activity and network traffic, determining which behaviors are normal and which may indicate an attack. “Called the Cisco Security Agent [CSA], this host-based software technology changed our lives,” Boston said. “This product was quickly deployed to 35,000 workstations within about a week and fundamentally changed the way our security people functioned. They no longer reacted to yesterday’s or today’s attacks. They no longer had to aggressively apply patches that came from Microsoft or others to close security holes.

“CSA bought time for the company by immediately stopping activities to insert malware. This product looked for specific types of anomalies on the network that were closely coordinated with how hackers inserted their software. As an example, if a user is on the network and someone tries to install malware, a defensive window pops up asking whether you are trying to install a piece [of] software. If not, the system informs the user to quickly kill their activity before it destroys the machine,” Boston said. “This a great example of a defense that looks for unusual or abnormal activity seeking to exploit equipment and provides a choice: Do you want this to happen?”

After CSA deployment the only problems have been when users override the system. This zero update software protection reduces emergency patching in response to vulnerability announcements, minimizing downtime and expenses. The visibility and control of sensitive data through this system protects against loss from both user actions and targeted malware.

The Department of Homeland Security has title authority to deal with critical infrastructure owned and operated by the private sector, Boston said. Military and government agencies by law are not allowed to assist private industry with cybersecurity. “The U.S. government operates with very capable people who have world-class IT knowledge and skills. In many cases, they have developed and employ capabilities that far exceed private industry. The nation needs to address how to share and harness government capabilities to help protect the rest of the critical infrastructure.”

Advanced persistent threats concern U.S. officials and other governments. These are threats based on technology providers who globalize their business, resourcing and assembling some products in far-flung parts of the world, Boston said. “The advanced persistent threat refers to products in this vast supply chain where adverse functions may have been embedded in some components or they have been modified by an adversary to perform in ways not intended.”

Cisco, working in conjunction with technology partners, is looking at how to deal with known cyber-attack vectors against hardware and software in its products. “We are doing a number of things to assure secure product life cycles in areas such as watermarking software and providing methods to verify its validity. Cisco also harnesses technology designed into its commercial systems to detect counterfeit chips embedded in products,” Boston said.

Another cybersecurity system involves Cisco’s SensorBase, which uses a rating scale to determine whether incoming traffic is from a known hostile host or a legitimate source. Cisco bought IronPort® in 2007, and SenderBase®, a reputation service, was part of that deal. IronPort provides a suite of products with high-performance and technically innovative solutions designed to secure organizations of all sizes. Deployed at the gateway to protect networks, IronPort enables a powerful perimeter defense. SenderBase evolved into SensorBase, which immediately drops connections to bad hosts based on their reputations.

“We have a great set of sensors to avoid anomalous attacks. Cisco knows what normal traffic looks like and how to quickly identify and avoid hostile traffic,” Boston said. “Strong relationships with service providers enable the company to ‘black hat’ hackers, identifying IP addresses that are part of hostile traffic. This feature enables turning off the ability of those IP addresses to communicate with us.”

Company experts study after-action reports from network attacks to learn and create better defenses. Cisco also shares information with the government on hostile actions. Constantly searching for ways to attract talent with the skills to deal with cybersecurity advances and evolving threats, Cisco develops the most innovative defenses possible, Boston said. Strong cybersecurity not only prevents information leaks and network damage, but also supports government cost-saving initiatives – cloud computing, telecommuting, and citizen self-service.

Operating a surplus Army target drone as a low-cost proof-of-concept autonomous unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the two men are proving that a digital communications Achilles’ heel poses grave challenges for the nation. The drone is equipped with modular cyber attack hardware and software.

Indeed, this airborne hacking capability is emerging in an era where the Defense Department considers information a weapon system. Intercepting and corrupting wireless communications points out serious battlefield vulnerabilities. Moreover, their airborne hacking toolkit effectively disrupts and corrupts wireless network communications.

Michael J. Tassey and Richard Perkins’ cybersecurity experience with Wall Street firms and government agencies, including the intelligence community, helped them develop capabilities that center on attacking, infiltrating and exploiting computer networks, mobile devices and cellular phones. They constructed a modular cyber attack payload consisting of various off-the-shelf components, both in the UAV and on the ground, according to Tassey.

Almost simultaneously, the U.S. Air Force is looking to conduct similar battlefield cyber warfare with unmanned aerial vehicles. The service plans possible cyber operations with follow-ons to the General Atomics-Aeronautical Systems Predator or Reaper UAVs.

Components in Tassey and Perkins’ cyber warfare package are extremely small in volume and weight. They also are available at almost any commercial electronics outlet as well as online. This explosion of open-source hardware and software enables anyone with a few hundred dollars and electronics or cyber expertise to possibly duplicate their concept. Tassey explained that is precisely why they developed this technology – to prove what terrorists, criminals or other enemies might accomplish in infiltrating WiFi networks that wirelessly link electronic devices.

A modified Army target drone functioning as an airborne hacking system is equipped with off-the-shelf hardware and software to attack wireless battlefield networks through an array of onboard WiFi, Bluetooth and cellular technologies.

Perkins and Tassey, who served together in the Air Force and subsequently collaborated in the cybersecurity domain, obtained a free surplus Styrofoam target drone, which they still fly. They also bought six additional airframes for $250 each as backups. The Federal Aviation Administration limits the maximum altitude at which they can fly the airborne hacking system to 400 feet above ground level. The ultra quiet UAV is powered by an electric motor and the onboard hacking equipment is battery powered.

They call the airborne system the wireless aerial surveillance platform. Onboard UAV equipment includes an IMSI catcher, an eavesdropping device to intercept cellular phones, usually undetectable by users of mobile phones. Cell phones can also be tricked into routing calls through the drone instead of commercial cell towers.

The aerial cyber package can disable cell phone encryption, or record calls using Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), before routing the call to the intended receiver. Using jamming signals, the aircraft’s onboard cyber package can render networks unusable by attacking data providers for as long as the UAV is in the air, Tassey said. Equipped with a 340-million word dictionary, the drone package not only detects wireless networks but also determines passwords.

Perkins and Tassey used an extensive array of test equipment for proof-of-concept demonstration access points adjacent to Scott Air Force Base at a model club flying facility in Belleville, Ill. The signals for the demonstration were powered on the ground to duplicate friendly wireless communications. These off-the-shelf access points are representative of what is available in 802.11 wireless hardware systems. This 802.11 is an international set of standards for implementing wireless local area network (WLAN) computer communications in the 2.4-, 3.6- and 5-GHz frequency bands, Tassey said.

“Think of the drone as a flying laptop. There is actually a Linux-based computer on the UAV, which is actively controlled by operators on the ground. Rather than placing hackers on the ground in a target area, where they might be detected, the drone allows multiple hackers to be anywhere in the world and see whatever the aircraft sees in the electromagnetic spectrum to attack systems on the ground,” Tassey said.

He added that an array of onboard WiFi, Bluetooth and cellular equipment enables network access. The UAV is capable of gaining access to 802.11 wireless networks to gather intelligence, exfiltrate or manipulate data, create rogue servers and services, or cause denial of service.

Focusing on projecting cyber attacks through the aircraft against systems and networks on the ground requires real-time interaction with the payload systems. Sufficient bandwidth is required to upload tools, stream voice and video and forward traffic to the Internet, Tassey explained.

The UAV gains the ability to manipulate Global System for Mobile Communications, or GSM, cellular phone calls and text messaging and allowing control – a change in the UAV threat paradigm. Tassey noted that the UAV is equipped with a pair of 900-megahertz 802.15.4 XBee radios, which provide telemetry and data link. The channels are protected by 128-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), a specification for electronic data adopted by the U.S. government.

Much of the aircraft’s capability relies on performing mathematically complex operations such as cracking passwords and performing brute force attacks against secure wireless computer networks and cellular devices. To enable the aircraft to provide processing-intensive functions and voice backhaul, an off-airframe processing capability has been created, which can reside anywhere on the Internet, Tassey said. This tiny onboard x86-based package for cyber warfare uses the same architecture as a desktop computer and is approximately the size of a cigarette package, weighing about 3 pounds. This equipment costs approximately $2,000 in the marketplace.

This airborne cyber equipment could be packaged to operate in any number of UAVs in the U.S. inventory; however, if the aircraft flies at 30,000 feet, as an example, signal amplification equipment would be necessary, along with antenna modifications. “The chilling result of our efforts it that the worldwide hacker community has developed open source hacking tools that could be put together by a layman without special skills. This vulnerability must be addressed,” Tassey concluded.

Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.: Budget figures released in advance of the 2012 defense spending request show that the defense budget will continue to grow through FY 2014, albeit at reduced levels. This comes as U.S. forces leave Iraq and Afghanistan, places where you served in combat. What is your position and that of your committee colleagues on this current budget?

Congressman Duncan Hunter: The House Armed Services Committee is closely examining the Defense Department’s budget request, delving into line items in an effort to identify approximately $100 billion over the five-year defense plan that can be redirected through budget amendments. These funds will be in areas where critical programs appear to be underfunded. One example in 2012 is restoring research and development [R&D] funding. The administration requested $75.3 billion for R&D, but this is about $5.6 billion less than the 2011 request, a 6 percent reduction. R&D is the lifeblood of the nation’s technological progress. Cutting-edge science from military development programs often spills over into commercial sectors. A graphic example is the Internet, which began as a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency method of digital communications with government laboratories.

After eight years of war, equipment and weapons systems are worn out. Does the FY 2012 budget request allow replacing of critical combat systems? If not, is Congress looking at redirecting funding for this purpose?

No, it does not provide a reset for weapons systems upgrades that the services have requested. All of the numbers are in the ether, meaning we are working from a bad Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR], or at best a guess. In reality, there appears to be no intelligence assessment that accurately predicts the evolving world threat situation. We must know the risks involved to size and fund force structure and weapons modernization programs. The committee needs a threat assessment that will accurately foresee things like the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, and other regional powers. Knowing the threat allows adequate funding to manage risks.

Whether this threat analysis comes from the Defense Intelligence Agency, RAND Corporation, a university, or a military college doesn’t matter. Managing risks mandates an accurate analysis, but this has not been done in time for the 2012 markup; however, we will have it in time for the next budget cycle. National security simply costs money, but it protects our nation and we need to grasp and understand that concept – defense is not cheap.

Committee Chairman Rep. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, R-Calif., has publicly raised “significant concerns” over the 2012 Pentagon budget request for $670.9 billion, including $117.8 billion for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This request is $13 billion less than projected a year ago and $36.5 billion less than current-year spending. What are your thoughts on the amount requested, and is it adequate?

The Defense Department’s funding request should start with each of the service chiefs stating, as an example, a top-line concept telling the committee “this is everything we need by priority to literally prepare for any possible threat scenario.” Then, the acceptable funding levels will be matched against projected threats and effective counters. Until this is done, the committee is throwing darts. We want to be certain that we can cover at least 65 percent to 70 percent of the threat base, whatever that budget figure might become. This approach would provide effective risk management. The threat scenario will determine the forces and weapons needed and thus funding levels. Until we receive this information, Congress will have to act on what the service chiefs say they need, regardless of the administration’s request.

Having been through the annual authorization process before, in general, how would you describe the Pentagon’s 2012 budget request before the markup?

It seems to me, as our committee chairman pointed out, that the Defense Department cannot propose cutting some $500 billion in spending over the next decade while continuing with business as usual. Fiscal responsibility, transparency, and accountability are department imperatives. Unless the department determines the basic requirements through proper due diligence, other countries could become emboldened to challenge our nation. The Defense Department must come to grips with the fact it cannot continue with its wasteful ways and expect better results. We, as a nation, face difficult choices and must resolve America’s defense and acquisition management issues. The department will not continue to succeed with its funding requests without identifying the basic causes of defense inefficiencies.

As an example, more than half of the Defense Department’s financial management community works outside typical auditing and accounting norms. Committee members expressed concerns the department lacks the management and fiscal concepts needed to administer defense resources. As a business major, and having run my own company, I know that you cannot run a successful organization this way. The 2012 markup requires a Defense Department financial management certification program. This authorization bill further requires the comptroller general to annually assess actual departmental savings realized in comparison to the secretary’s proposed efficiency initiatives. More importantly, however, the 2012 markup ensures that troops deployed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other garden spots have the training, equipment, and resources to successfully complete their missions and return home.

Former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates’ efficiency initiative provided with the FY 2012 budget request identified $154 billion in potential savings through 2016. Among identified cuts is the Marine Corps Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), intended to replace the 1970s-era Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV). As a combat Marine officer in Iraq and Afghanistan, what are your thoughts on providing effective ship-to-shore movement of Marines over hostile beaches?

The EFV issue has been strongly reverberating and I’ve gotten out in front with an op-ed piece in the newspaper and another on my website. As after every war, there is a nattering, chattering mafia that begins questioning the need for a Marine Corps amphibious force in readiness. You would think they would have learned by now. However, there is a persistent undercurrent to do away with the Marine Corps. That never goes away.

One example: The next two Navy amphibious assault ships for Marine Corps landings are being built without well decks to launch EFVs or Amphibious Combat Vehicles [ACVs], beefed-up, next-generation versions of the old AAVs. Instead, these amphibious ships are designed as small 45,000-ton displacement aircraft carriers to launch MV-22 tilt-rotor Ospreys and F-35B vertical takeoff and landing strike fighters. This is a leadership failure. Using tilt-rotor aircraft to land Marines assumes control of the air, which may not always be the case.

The minimum number of amphibious ships for Marine Corps operations is 33, but the number available is short two. The Air Force wants control of the air and the Army wants an amphibious role. Meanwhile, the Marine Corps is asking for and will accept less, putting their trust in the other services.

We need Marine Corps leaders to explain why billions have been wasted on the EFV and what is needed in a new assault vehicle in terms of speed, weaponry, and survivability – how much speed and range are required and the necessary standoff distance from the beach.

The Navy says it could completely prep the battlefield and allow Marines to come ashore in cruise ships or Zodiacs; however, there is a history here. We either often fail to get the fire support needed or it’s ineffective and landing units must dig in deep and remain a long time on the beach, suffering casualties.

The ACV will not be available for 10 years, if at all. We shouldn’t assume future threats would be any easier. We’re not buying it. The committee requires studies before the Marine Corps can embark on an EFV replacement. The Marine Corps mission hasn’t changed. This EFV decision goes down hard for the committee and we will monitor it closely.

The Pentagon plan adds $4 billion for the F-35 fighter program for system design and development, but purchases only 31 F-35s instead of 41 as earlier planned. What is the reason for this change? Another program element hit by Gates’ efficiency push is the F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft for the Marines, which has been placed on a two-year probation. The Corps is counting heavily on this aircraft to replace aging Harriers. What can be done to assure adequate funding for a future STOVL replacement?

The committee approved of $7.7 billion for F-35 development and procurement of 32 aircraft for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. The markup also limits the obligation or expenditure of funds for performance improvements to the F-35 propulsion system, unless the secretary of defense ensures funds are made available and spent in fiscal year 2012 for two options for the F-35 propulsion system. Meanwhile, General Electric and Rolls-Royce are funding the F136 engine with their own money, which could later force another competition between the two engines for the F-35. The committee may have to step into the breach and ensure the F-35B stays on track and is adequately funded.

Compensating for F-35 delays, the Defense Department plans to procure an additional 41 F/A-18s from 2012-2016. What is the logic behind this procurement of an aircraft design that dates back beyond the 1980s?

The F-35 delays have no bearing on procuring additional F/A-18 Super Hornet aircraft. This is a solid and rugged platform with an outstanding weapons system that can drive a nail with its accuracy. Just as with the A-10, the aircraft is needed to fill out the inventory and deliver a blow with battlefield interdiction, especially against armor. The committee’s 2012 markup funds 12 EA-18G electronic warfare aircraft for the Navy at $1.1 billion, and 24 F/A-18Es and Fs at $2.4 billion.

The Army will reduce end strength by 27,000 soldiers, consolidate commands, and take other actions to curb funding. The Marine Corps’ end strength will be reduced by 15,000 to 20,000 Marines. Why cut force structure when history repeatedly shows the need for contingency operations and a force in readiness?

Force structure will remain an issue into the future. However, we have to assume that the Marine Corps Commandant, Gen. James F. Amos, knows what he is doing. He said he wants to downsize to a smaller force structure to provide a leaner 911 Corps as opposed to another ground army. The general wants to accept less and go back to the Marine Corps’ frugal ways. Nevertheless, I simply don’t see the practical advantage of that approach.

Does the 2012 defense spending request allow for adequate acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), fixed wing and helicopters, which proved so crucial in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region?

Unmanned aerial vehicles are performing missions better than envisioned. They are the weapons systems of choice, especially in areas of rugged terrain such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Funding requests and procurement numbers in 2012 are adequate for these multimission platforms. It is likely that we will never again become involved in combat without heavily using numerous UAVs overhead. The open and barren terrain in Southwest Asia favors drones for surveillance, unlike jungle canopies of Southeast Asia.

Is the Navy’s Future Years Defense Plan shipbuilding plan realistic? Demands by U.S. regional commanders are growing faster than BMD-capable Aegis ships, even though the number of Aegis ships expands from 20 to 38 by the end of 2015. As China’s anti-ship ballistic missile, an area denial threat to U.S. aircraft carriers, begins deployment, there is a plan to increase numbers of Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers using the SM-3 hit-to-kill anti-ballistic missile. However, the SM-3 production line is not operating at full capacity. It would appear that additional SM-3s are required to meet the threats and that some could be land-based in Southeast Asia to effectively ease the burden on the fleet. What are your thoughts in this regard? Please discuss in some detail.

The nation needs all of the Aegis ships and Standard missiles we can afford because we are not deploying ground-based missile defense interceptors in places like Poland.

Having maritime basing is not a bad play, especially over the next decade as we pull back from areas run by dictators or other bad actors, such as Bahrain, where population unrest lingers. We must stop supporting dictator regimes that kill their own people every day. This will mean sea basing, increasing the Navy’s 313-ship fleet objective to perhaps 400 or more ships to project American power.

Aegis and SM-3 should prove effective against Chinese deployment of anti-ship ballistic missiles. However, this system could also be land-based on Pacific Islands or with Asian allies and prove effective.

This interview was first published in Defense: Summer 2011 Edition.

Boutelle recently sat down with senior writer Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., to answer questions about IP technology and other information technology topics within the govenment and private sectors.

Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.: As the Army’s wartime CIO/G-6 for more than four years, you played a critical role in bringing the military, especially combat forces, into the digital Internet Protocol era. Does that experience translate directly to your Cisco Systems assignments?

Lt. Gen. Steven W. Boutelle, U.S. Army (Ret.): Being at Cisco is an ideal fit. When I left as the Army’s CIO/G-6, I was particularly looking for unique opportunities, to continue along the lines with what I was doing in the Army. I’m not smart enough to start over, and I’m a big proponent of Internet Protocol and moving everything over IP. In fact, during my tour, the Army and the other services started using IP to rapidly move information over satellite. I wanted to join an organization heavily involved in IP. Obviously, Cisco is the largest company with the majority of global IP. Annual revenues are $40 billion and there are some 75,000 employees. The opportunity to work at Cisco and continue the message of exploiting IP was perfect. The role I play at Cisco involves dealing with governments, militaries, and industries around the world, areas with which I am not unfamiliar.

Boutelle, left, visits Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan, with Lt. Gen. Anthony R. Jones, U.S. Army (Ret.). Boutelle was then the Army's CIO/G-6. Both generals subsequently retired and joined industry: Boutelle is chief executive officer of Cisco's Internet Routing in Space initiative and vice president, Business Development, Global Government Solutions Group. Jones is vice president and Huntsville, Ala., senior site executive, Boeing Missile Systems Division. Photo courtesy of Lt. Gen. Steven W. Boutelle, U.S. Army (Ret.)

How did you gain the necessary momentum and create the Army’s IP transition as rapidly as required?

Between the regular force, National Guard, and Reserve, the Army is a huge organization, making it somewhat difficult to move very rapidly in another direction. However, after some 30 years, even with technical updates, it was time to convert from mobile subscriber equipment [MSE] and tri-service tactical systems [TRI-TAC] to newer technology with a massive swing into IP. The commanding general of the 3rd Infantry Division, during his advance on Baghdad, told us that MSE and TRI-TAC could not meet his combat requirements. The commercial sector already was involved heavily with IP – e-mail, websites, Web surfing, Facebook, and Twitter, as examples. Terrorist attacks on 9/11, especially the one in the Pentagon, right in our workspaces, helped us gain traction. The resources made available through supplemental budgets and immediate wartime funding enabled speeding the acquisition and implementation of IP-based systems and equipment. What the U.S. Army has and is still experiencing is not unlike what other nations’ militaries are also going through. Most foreign armies watch the U.S. Army very closely, especially in wartime. They “cherry pick” whatever is successful and also learn from our mistakes. Still, making that transition from large investments in time division multiple access [TDMA] equipment to IP involves difficult decisions. We invested significant resources to convert to everything over IP, especially for combat units in Iraq and Afghanistan. Other nations want to convert to IP but may not have the resources to embark on all the programs the U.S. Army has undertaken.

Was there an IP model quickly available for integration into the Army, especially for combat command and control?

Equipment models from an airborne signal battalion and the Joint Communications Support Element [JCSE] offered an insight into a command and control system in a relatively small package. The JCSE is always the first U.S. unit to deploy anywhere for a contingency. Their equipment, encompassing a miniature satellite antenna, provided the basis for moving high-speed, high-capacity IP to division, brigade, and battalion. Commanders could immediately connect to defense networks via the Internet. These technologies spawned the Joint Network Node – deployed, with industry’s help, to Iraq within six months. The rest is history. Simultaneously, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki made imperative the establishment within a year of Army Knowledge Online [AKO]. The portal became operational to all soldiers and other users around the world for both classified and unclassified access. This website has grown into Defense Knowledge Online [DKOL] with some 6 million users, involving all of the services.

How did you go about building the network infrastructure to serve soldiers through Army Knowledge Online, with streamlined access to content for every soldier and civilian employee?

AKO converged voice, data, video to the Army in an enhanced network, building an infrastructure to initially serve 1.9 million users. AKO became an industry-recognized portal, later expanded using an IT portfolio management program that helped reduce costs of systems and applications by half. The AKO issue initially was that commercial products could not handle the scale and volume of log-ons as the portal grew exponentially. Some of the companies who came to us with products they claimed could handle the volume soon discovered they could not. We helped them scale their products to become large and robust enough to handle AKO. The portal has evolved rapidly and today active-duty soldiers discover a wealth of information – acquisition, health and medical, personnel records, efficiency reports, as a few examples. Embedded in DKOL is also access to Army, Navy, and Air Force portals that share common services, and we believe they should also use common hardware. Most of the DKOL services are the same, with only some service-unique items that are different.

How did you handle AKO security with the volume of user log-on?

The system is designed to validate the user and establishes identity through a Common Access Card [CAC] with a chip embedded. The latest model CAC contains advanced technology, which will enhance the security of federally controlled facilities and computer systems and ensure a safer work environment for all employees and contractors. The card establishes user identity, levels of security, access permission, and denies access to any higher levels of classification. I still have a CAC card in my wallet because I am involved in government programs.

In what ways are you still involved with the Army and its IP programs?

I’ve tried to distance myself from the Army in many ways; however, I periodically maintain contact when asked by senior officials from the general staff or the Defense Department. While I’ve moved out of the Army, I’m still here to help and assist when called upon and I do that quite often. But it’s always at their request, not my request. As an example, Cisco plays important roles in cyber security and I advise military and government officials on cyber-related areas. Also, Cisco owns the majority of core networks, so it is an ideal place from which to advise the government and the armed services. I provide liaison with Army Gen. Keith B. Alexander, commander of the new U.S. Cyber Command, who was the Army’s G-2 when I was the G-6. I also have a solid relationship with Maj. Gen. Rhett A. Hernandez, USA, who heads the Army’s Cyber Command. We have talked at length about the Army’s involvement in the cyber world. The Army doesn’t build networks, systems, or components. They come from industry. I am sometimes concerned that the Army or other services are reluctant to reach out to industry and ask for cyber assistance. There may be significant expertise in the government. Nevertheless, those who build the routers, switches, and networks are in the commercial sector. Technology moves very quickly and there needs to be constant and continuous dialog with industry.

You were widely known for serving as a mentor to a large number of flag officers while on active duty. Are you still involved in the mentoring process?

One of the things I often recall is a walk across the Mojave Desert at the Army’s National Training Center together [with] my own mentor, a four-star general about to retire. He was in a reflective mood, confiding that he might have accomplished far more for the Army by taking bigger risks sooner, being aggressive, inventive, and willing to go out on a limb while still a more junior flag officer. That was a poignant moment. I did not know it then, but my name was already on the selection list for brigadier general. That general pointed out that many flag officers fail to realize how much authority, opportunity, and capability they have to influence the Army, to enable great progress by being imaginative, resourceful, and innovative – to become military visionaries. I always tried to keep that lesson in mind, climbing out on limbs when it was important to craft a major effort. Just as I have leaned on mentors, I’ve tried to return the favor and help others. Occasionally, I continue to mentor some Army officers and government officials when I have something to offer. Cisco routinely provides internal mentoring programs that address myriad technical subjects and operations. There are also opportunities when we mentor government officials, and I am involved in some of that. I always try to find the smartest people at Cisco to accompany me. We recently had one of these mentoring sessions with the Army, where we walked through a number of technical issues and they have asked us to return. Usually, Cisco’s part in mentoring occurs when a general officer or senior civilian steps into [a] new role.

As vice president of Cisco’s Global Government Solutions Group, it seems that your principal mission is to advise military and government customers on technologies and practices to enhance their mission goals. With the explosion of information technologies, this mission would seem difficult. How do you go about locating the best technologies available and then demonstrating those capabilities with client infrastructure?

Cisco is a very competitive company. If you take a week or two off, it will seem like you have missed so much because technology progresses at warp speed. There are always smart people in other companies; however, Cisco’s brain trust is without parallel. Part of the competition is not only understanding Cisco’s technology, but also knowing what other companies are doing and the technologies they are developing. So, I reach out within Cisco, where I actually have some mentors, usually software engineers who spend several hours in a room with white boards to educate me on routers, switches, and networks that are evolving – a glimpse in the future and where Cisco is going. This is not a job; it’s a profession, and we have an obligation to remain current and stay abreast of emerging technologies, to learn on our own. This aspect requires a great deal of reading professional journals, periodicals, and technical papers. We must continually study to remain relevant.

Does pushing the technology envelope require a large group of dedicated Cisco technical experts?

Information flows throughout the company, as you might expect from such a forward-leaning organization. There is great synergy in operating at the leading edge of all information technology aspects. Advances, or breakthroughs, rapidly filter throughout Cisco’s various organizations with applications concepts.

How swiftly can Cisco move?

Cisco is widely known for its agility even though it is becoming a very large company. As a global organization, operating in hundreds of countries, we can, nevertheless, maneuver swiftly whenever required to address implementation of new technologies and systems, or acquire innovative companies. As an example, we acquired WebEx Communications Inc. over a single weekend. This new company provides on-demand collaboration, online meetings, Web conferencing, and videoconferencing applications. Cisco is 25 years old and we relentlessly struggle to avoid becoming bureaucratic or set in our ways. We operate with more mature processes because our work force requires it. But it is always a balancing act to remain agile and move quickly to market. While we continue to grow at approximately 17 percent a year, the imperative is persistently to fight and make certain that the process is never more important than the product.

Boutelle pictured at Cisco Systems. His headquarters are in Herndon, Va. Photo by Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.

You also serve as CEO of Cisco’s Internet Routing in Space initiative. Please discuss this assignment in some detail and how you go about extending the information transport power of the Internet into space.

That’s a great question. One of the things that enticed me to Cisco was the opportunity to become closely involved in this government program. Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, initially started the space-based router effort while he headed U.S. Strategic Command. His desire was to determine how quickly the commercial sector could put a package on a satellite. The package selected was a router. Cisco was not then heavily involved. There were some difficulties in reaching operational capability, and Cisco was asked whether they could make the router in space successful. Cisco, in turn, asked me to take the lead in that effort. The router went into space in November 2009 and went through a joint technology capability demonstration [JTCD]. The demonstration turned out extremely successful in January through March 2010. Initially, Cisco viewed this project as something to help the government. Looking at satellite operators around the world, however, we soon discovered they were much like telephone companies of 15 years ago, before they converted to IP. Today, most of us have voice, data, and video in our homes, if we want it, and all of that is over IP. Conversion to IP was a massive inflection point for telephone companies and many initially missed it. Satellite companies are much the same. They are a very conservative industry that primarily sells transponders, which is a bent pipe. Most transponders operate on a bent-pipe principle, referring to sending back what goes into the conduit with only amplification and a shift from uplink to downlink frequency, as opposed to a regenerative system, where the signal is remade and remodulated.

What was Cisco’s move in response to the satellite company’s traditional attitude?

With the results from the JTCD, it became obvious to us that there needs to be an increase in what can be accomplished via satellite. This is the case, especially if satellites are converged and made seamless with the ground infrastructure. Using IP routing and switching on all satellites in a constellation and merging them with a ground network provides a powerful, seamless capability. This particularly is the situation with the military and perhaps with their unmanned aerial vehicles. The substantiation of this concept was proof of principal using the Intelsat 14 spacecraft with a Cisco router onboard transmitting streaming voice, data, and video for collaboration. Cisco’s Call Manager is on the satellite’s package, an enterprise-class IP telephony call-processing system that provides traditional features as well as advanced capabilities, such as mobility, presence, preference, and rich conferencing services.

How do you integrate disparate satellite systems and ground infrastructure for both commercial and government users anytime, anywhere with IP-based data, video, and voice in mobile communications?

Today, we are cross banding with satellite-based IP, switching from C-band to Ku-band as an example. This capability is being used by some North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries and in Haiti for earthquake recovery operations. Multiple applications have emerged with the Cisco router in space. Satellite companies with their high margins have become very comfortable and complacent and nothing has been driving them to change. Indeed, the router in space demonstration over the last few months is another clear inflection point for that industry. Many satellite operators are now approaching Cisco, noting that they need to change rapidly. This router in space is a very powerful indicator and satellite companies know they need to transform by adding the capability. Indeed, IP routing is yet another example of the type of out-of-the-box thinking that the Army constantly seeks. This is an example of providing soldiers on the ground with an overmatch capability to exploit an adversary. However, there is a panoply of similar technologies available in the world marketplace, making speed essential.

Can you provide other examples of this out-of-the-box technology approach?

Moving into the commercial IP world’s voice, data, and video allows us to use our legacy analog systems and sensors and convert their output into IP packets. Once in packets, the data can be mixed and matched and routed to wherever needed. If you send a stream of data to a satellite and convert it, those IP packets can be shipped anywhere, and you start to address interoperability at the transport level. When you bring a data stream from a brigade up to a Ku-Band transponder on the satellite, it can be sent back down a C-band transponder via IP, simultaneously to multiple locations. Once data are in IP packets, a lot of difficult interoperability issues evaporate. There are commercial IP products in the market today that can resolve many interoperability problems. One is Cisco’s IP Interoperability and Collaboration System, or IPICS. Another is Twisted Pair Solution’s WAVE software. They are being adopted in the Army. By applying IPICS, analog radios and modem signals can be brought in and converted to IP packets. This is a cost-effective way to integrate almost any analog or digital communications system for easy interoperation. Converting voice and data into IP packets is the common denominator. Voice from a World War II radio could be converted to IP voice packets, or a Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System [SINCGARS] could tie in and operate in IP packets, and it is all done with software. That’s the magic formula: common IP packets that are pervasive around the globe.

Recently, you also joined the board of directors of PacStar, a Portland, Ore., technology-based communications provider. What does the company offer in terms of enhancing military situational awareness and C4ISR in general?

Cisco’s leadership is very good about allowing us to sit on boards of other companies that are related to something we may be interested in. My rule is that I will not sit on a board of a company that I do not believe adds value to the enterprise, or that I am not personally interested in. I looked over PacStar and discovered they fulfill a void that Cisco is unable to provide. This company supplies small product packages that are Cisco-based, but that Cisco does not produce. This product is used on a wide range of mobile units such as the JCSE and small combat units operating in Afghanistan. PacStar’s certified network designs implement and deliver the latest technologies and solutions from Cisco, Brocade, Enterasys, and others to meet all local area network switching and routing needs.

Will you please cite specific examples of PacStar’s technologies?

PacStar provides software-managed secure voice, data, and video capabilities for deployable military and commercial enterprise applications. Two product examples are the 6800 Small End Office [SMEO] and the PacStar 6300 Deployable Voice Exchange. Both have received information assurance accreditation by the Defense IA/Security Accreditation Working Group [DSAWG]. These solutions have also received interoperability certification by the Joint Interoperability Test Command [JITC], which is rare. The packages are certified to handle classifications from top secret to unclassified over Defense Department and military networks. Consequently, the Defense Information Systems Agency placed them on the approved product list. PacStar’s 6800 and 6300 solutions enable the military to connect to the Defense Switched Network [DSN], eliminating cumbersome two-step analog to IP network complexity. Also, the PacStar 6800 is the only SMEO voice switch based on Cisco’s Unified Communications platform, accredited for the DSN. The PacStar products fill an important requirement for U.S. Army and special operations forces, using existing equipments in converting everything to IP at the source.

Are you also on other corporate boards?

I recently joined the board of ThreatMetrix, a company with a system designed to detect fraud, protecting e-commerce and social media firms from online chicanery. A number of technologies are applied to detect fraud. This system can recognize devices – desktop computers, laptops, or phones – that are used to log onto a site. The technology associates some 200 characteristics of the user’s device and decides whether fraud is involved. This all occurs in milliseconds by matching to large signature databases that are constantly updated. ThreatMetrix provides a cloud-based service without requiring that consumers provide personally identifiable information, such as social security numbers. Transactions are authorized in real time, or users suspected of fraud are blocked. I am very impressed with this company and how their system might be applied to AKO.

Security for all IT systems is becoming increasingly important, both in government and commercial corporate networks. This is especially critical when operating networks in space where data are transferred from Earth terminals. What role is Cisco playing to help assure that networks remain safe?

We are heavily involved with the U.S. government and other governments around the world to assure they are comfortable with respect to Cisco’s product lines and how they are implemented within their networks. We strive to be certain that the product is manufactured or the programming accomplished, so that this is truly a Cisco product that meets our rigorous standards in every respect. In fact, the FBI has made several significant arrests in the last few years of those counterfeiting Cisco products. We work very closely with our government customers and others to help them identify whether they really have a true Cisco product – a router, switch, or operating system that has never been tampered with. This is very high on our priority list. If tampering is detected, we immediately notify authorities. We also make certain that governments understand the issues and what Cisco is doing to resolve them.

What do you see in technology trends and where are we headed for the next big military and government information technology leap?

The government and military have pockets of excellence where they are taking the big steps toward the difficult things. Some of these involve what we call clouds and another area is virtualization. Today, rapid technological and architectural changes are transforming the data center into a virtualized environment and Cisco is at the forefront. Some data centers in the government operate with real visionaries; however, I don’t see this at the enterprise level. Cloud computing offers a simple way to deliver complex technology, including large-scale business applications where customers access hosted applications and resources over the Internet with a Web browser. Virtualization is the creation of a virtual [rather than actual] version of something, such as an operating system, a server, a storage device, or network resources. Nonetheless, the question persists: Who are today’s military visionaries? Who is the next late Adm. Art Cebrowski, USN? According to a 2006 UPI-published commentary by Arnaud de Borchgrave, “What Clausewitz was to war, Sun Tzu was to The Art of War 25 centuries ago. And what Mao Zedong was to guerrilla warfare, Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski was to net-centric warfare. His concept of warfare united ships, aircraft, satellites and ground forces in effective and speedy ways.” The next visionary must assert what we are going to do across the Defense Department or the Army or the Navy, and here’s how we are going to do it. That person remains elusive. There are some important ideas, but who will be willing to take the risk, to walk out on that limb for the next big step?

This article first appeared in The Year in Defense: Review Edition, Winter 2011.

Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Richard A. Cody led that tricky, low-altitude Apache assault. At 2:36 a.m. on January 17, 1991, he was the commanding officer, 1st Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment. Within four minutes, the Apaches’ deadly weapons destroyed all of the radars and associated equipment, providing a 10-kilometer-wide path through which allied fighters and bombers could approach Iraqi targets undetected.

Soon after Iraq seized Kuwait, the 101st Airborne’s ready brigade was alerted to begin the process of deploying. The mission quickly changed from an infantry brigade with some Apache helicopters, to a full helicopter battalion for rapid build up of combat power, Gen. Cody said. Twelve Apaches with their aircrews from his battalion were split between two Air Force C-5 cargo aircraft as they took off for Saudi Arabia.

Initially assigned to King Faud Air Base as a covering force, Gen. Cody, then a lieutenant colonel, was told to see Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf’s Special Operations commander. He was given a top-secret briefing using high-resolution satellite imagery. “I was asked whether Apaches could take out certain types of ground control early warning facilities,” Gen. Cody explained. After looking at the photographs, the general determined that each early warning station was equipped with Soviet-built Flat Eye, Squat Eye and Spoon Rest intercept radars, along with tropospheric scatter, command and control vans and associated equipment.

“Apaches are designed to kill tanks and other armored vehicle targets with hellfire missiles, but I responded that we could use the missiles, rockets, and 30-millimeter chain guns against the targets. The question was asked again to determine whether mission success was probable. The Iraqi early warning sites were arranged like a picket fence between Kuwait and Jordan. The particular sites we were to go after were due north of a Saudi town called Arar, some 300 miles northwest of King Khalid Military City, and just under the tri-border area near Wadi Al-Batin,” the general said.

AH-64A Apache advanced attack and OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) stand ready at a forward operating base during Operation Desert Storm. DoD photo by Staff Sgt. Dean Wagner.

Soon after the special operations meeting, Gen. Cody’s Apache battalion was placed under operational control of Central Command’s Special Operations and began training with MH-53 Pave Low helicopters from the Air Force 20th Special Operations Squadron. Low-level, long-range infiltration tactics, techniques and procedures were flown during the training missions. Aircraft would fly to a known point, move into battle formation and practice engaging targets. By early November, targets were fabricated at a rear-area Saudi Arabia bombing range that resembled Iraqi early warning sites. “We flew there and practiced a complete mission rehearsal, replicating distances and flying conditions. We went in and ‘took down’ those practice targets, using onboard video recorders in the Apaches during the live fire training, Gen. Cody said.”

The videos were shown to Gen. Schwarzkopf, and by December it looked like Saddam Hussein would not withdraw his forces from Kuwait. Gen. Cody still had not revealed the nature of the mission to his aircrews. The Apache pilots were told the training was for a special mission, working with Air Force MH-53 Pave Lows, which were combat search and rescue helicopters. It was anticipated by early January that the Apaches would attack the radar sites. Destroying two of the sites would provide a sufficient gap “for F-15s and other ‘fast movers’ to go through undetected, without alerting Iraqi air force interceptor aircraft and other air defense weapons systems,” he said.

On January 14, Gen. Cody’s unit was ordered to deploy with nine Apaches and a Blackhawk support helicopter. The attacking unit flew from King Fahd Airbase to King Khalid Military City. After refueling, the raiders resumed their flight northwest at low altitude to a town called Al-Jawf, Arabic for “starting point.” This small airfield was approximately an hour’s flying time south of Arar. Each Apache was armed with eight Hellfire missiles, 19 Hydra 2.75-inch rockets and 800 to 1,000 rounds of 30-millimeter ammunition.

“On January 15, we went through what we call an air mission rehearsal, and this was the first time the target folders were laid out for the aircrews.” The Army aviators were briefed “that we were going into Iraq to start the war,” the general said. A complete weapons check of each aircraft was completed, and the raiders prepared for the mission.

The air war was scheduled to begin at 3:00 a.m., and destruction of the early warning sites had to be completed before that time. After an intelligence briefing and communications checks, the Apache and Pave Low aircraft lifted off at midnight from Al-Jawf.  A group attacking each of the two early warning sites consisted of four Apaches and two Pave Lows. These sections flew nearly parallel routes at an altitude of 50 feet at a 120-knot airspeed. They split off to follow separate wadis to their targets.

Two AH-64A Apache helicopters pass over the desert during Operation Desert Shield. Each helicopter is armed with a pair of 19-round launchers for 2.75-inch folding-fin aerial rockets; the helicopter at right is also carrying eight AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. DoD photo.

At a distance from the targets of 12 to 14 kilometers, depending on the early warning sites, the Pave Low helicopters came to hover and deployed infrared chemical lights. The lights, which could not be seen with the naked eye, were only visible using night vision equipment. “The lights were used to mark Global Positioning System (GPS) inertial navigation system data points already programmed in the aircraft Doppler navigation systems. Because Pave Lows have extremely accurate navigation systems, this provided great accuracy by allowing us to fly right over the chemical lights, determine error rates from low-level flying, and correct them. The Pave Lows peeled off south to a holding area, and we pressed forward as soon as we popped up out of the wadi,” Gen. Cody recalled.

The entire Iraqi target area was visible through Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensors from a distance of about 12 kilometers. “We moved to within 5 kilometers in an echelon right formation, and the four Apaches at each site simultaneously began launching Hellfire missiles. The first missiles took out communications and tropospheric scatter systems, shutting off the possibility of sounding a warning to the Iraqi intelligence operations center in Baghdad, which links all of that country’s radar sites,” Gen. Cody said. “Then, we systematically began taking out the vans that controlled the Spoon Rest, Squat Eye and Flat Face radar systems.”

Hydra 70 flechette rockets and the 30-millimeter chain guns were used against anti-aircraft gun positions guarding the radar sites, as the Apaches moved to within 4,000 meters of the positions. The Apaches destroyed every piece of radar equipment at each site, shattering buildings and vans. Gen. Cody’s wingman took enemy fire, and with three bullet holes through the rotor blades continued to fly the aircraft.

Iraqi air defense forces also fired at least two heat-seeking missiles at the joint Army-Air Force helicopter formation, but the missiles were avoided through electronic countermeasures and evasive action. There were no aircrew casualties. As the Apaches headed south away from the havoc, they heard more than a hundred jet aircraft overhead, passing through the gap in the radar, bound for Baghdad.

As the air campaign against Iraq was mounted, Special Operations Forces emplaced radar beacons along the northern Saudi border. Coalition pilots used the beacons to confirm their position when entering and leaving Iraq and they aided in command and control of allied aircraft.

Soon after the raid, Gen. Cody’s battalion rejoined their parent 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) as it prepared for the coming large-scale ground war. His unit took part in air assaults into several forward-operating bases deep inside Iraq. The Apache battalion was soon engaging Iraqi SA-6s, other air defense missiles, and enemy armored vehicles, as it protected a brigade of infantry projected more than a hundred miles into enemy territory. No other Army in the world could have moved that rapidly in a deep vertical envelopment, Gen. Cody concluded. He added that the raid on early warning sites “was a great coming out party for the Apache.”

This article was first published Desert Shield/Desert Storm: The 10th Anniversary of the Gulf War.

Carrier-based aircraft benefited from early attacks and fragmentation of Iraqi air defenses, which enabled destruction of individual nodes. The suppression of enemy air defense was instrumental in limiting friendly aircraft loses during the Gulf War. Navy EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft jammed enemy radars and attacked them with High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARMs).

During the first 24 hours of the air war more than 1,300 combat sorties were flown by fixed-wing aircraft of U.S. and coalition forces, including 812 strike sorties. Rear Adm. (Ret.) Jay Campbell, then a commander, was in the cockpit of an F-14 Tomcat fighter, leading the first 16-aircraft pre-dawn strike over Iraq from the USS Ranger. It was January 17, 1991 aboard the USS Ranger, and he was Commander of Air Wing Two.

An A-6E Intruder aircraft flies over the desert as it prepares for refueling during Operation Desert Storm. DoD photo by Tech. Sgt. Rose Reynolds.

Targets for the first Navy mission of the war were concentrated in the Al Basrah area at the nexus of Iraq and Iran. Prepared to engage Soviet-built Mig fighters, if they ventured into the wing’s attack area, the admiral observed from altitude as his wing’s A-6s headed for their targets at extremely low level and high speed. Numerous Iraqi surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were fired as the strike force entered the target area.

None of the other pilots in the strike force had previously seen combat, according to Adm. Campbell. He added that he had not seen anything like Iraq’s use of as many SAMs since flying over North Vietnam during the U.S. prisoner rescue attempt at Son Tay. At least eight Iraqi SAMs were fired at the Ranger’s attacking aircraft. However. EA-6Bs with jammers and S-3 aircraft equipped with decoy drones helped overcome the SAM threat. The admiral also believed that the Iraqi air defense sites were not properly tracking their targets, or the SAM fuses were improperly set for higher altitude engagements.

There were also pockets of Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) using barrage tactics to fire at the Ranger’s aircraft. Adm. Campbell is convinced the enemy was trying to cover aerial routes to and from the target area. The Iraqi air defense tactics proved to be ineffective, with none of the Ranger’s aircraft sustaining damage during this initial attack. Cockpit video recorded the A-6 strikes, showing low-lying patches of fog near some pier-side targets. The video also recorded SAMs streaking up above the Navy’s low-level attack aircraft, then attempting to turn and track targets at lower altitude before unsuccessfully detonating.

The admiral, who was also qualified to fly the A-6 Intruder, participated in a number of strike missions using that aircraft.

On the third night of the air war, one of the Ranger’s A-6s was lost while over Iraq, probably to AAA, Adm. Campbell said. “There was no ‘May Day’ call; the aircraft just failed to return to the carrier flight deck.” The admiral was again in an F-14, refueling from aerial tankers to extend the search for the missing A-6 crew. The wreckage and the air crew’s remains were not discovered until later. He is convinced that AAA destroyed the aircraft before the fliers could use the radio.

An underside view of a F-14A Tomcat aircraft on a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) during Operation Desert Storm. The aircraft is carrying four AIM-7 Sparrow missiles under its fuselage and two AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles on each wing pylon. DoD photo.

As combat missions continued, the air wing developed its own tactics, including medium-altitude armor attacks. A-6s were armed with mixed ordnance loads, including Cluster Bomb Units (CBUs), which were generally dropped from an 18,000 foot altitude. CBU fuses were set for a long delay and dispersion of bomblets against armor targets. The fuse delay enabled controlling, to some extent, the pattern of dispersion. A-6 pilots looked for a tube (gun) on each Iraqi ground-based platform before engaging a target, with smart guided munitions, Adm. Campbell explained.

“We kept our Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensors on all the way, looking for armored vehicle targets throughout formations. When we found a tube, we locked on to that target for a missile attack,” Adm. Campbell related. “Unless there was a tube, we didn’t expend the ordnance.” When locating convoys or other enemy concentrations, wing pilots often engaged with the CBUs. “We had good success with this tactic, mostly north of Iraq’s Tallil air base. The wing’s EA-6Bs, armed with HARMs, were used anytime missions were north into Iraq,” he added.

Before the war ended, Ranger’s air wing pilots went on the fly more than 4,300 combat sorties. As the wing commander, Adm. Campbell flew 23 sorties over Iraq and Kuwait, in both A-6 s and F-14s. Air Wing Two’s composition of only F-14s and A-6s provided long-range and all-weather capabilities. Three squadrons of A-6s in the wing provided the all-weather attack punch against ground targets.

Tactics developed by the wing during Desert Storm have been polished and integrated in Navy airborne training. Aerial maneuvers at Fallon, Nev. often involve integrated fighter-strike aircraft missions, along with tactics that emphasize prioritizing targets.

This article was first published Desert Shield/Desert Storm: The 10th Anniversary of the Gulf War.

Traversing through dense minefields and over obstacles with massed armor and firepower, the coalition forces executed complicated large-scale maneuvers against Iraq. The scope of this tank warfare had not been accomplished since World War II’s Africa campaign. These tricky maneuvers by VII Corps armor were against an entrenched enemy equipped with Soviet-built tanks. Coalition deception operations, an integral part of overall Desert Storm strategy, helped to keep enemy units in place and off balance about the intended direction of attack.

M2 Bradley fighting vehicles were at increased risk against Republican Guard tanks, but thanks to U.S. Army training were effectively protected by M1A1 Abrams tanks. DoD photo.

Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, then a lieutenant colonel and commanding officer of an M1A1 Abrams tank battalion, waited for the assault to begin. His 2nd Battalion, 66th Armor, part of the 3rd Brigade of the 2nd Armored Division in Germany, deployed to Saudi Arabia a few months earlier. Now the tank battalion was assigned to the 1st Infantry Division as part of a third brigade. The division was assigned to breach and punch a hole through Iraqi defenses directly opposite. The breaching operation was essential to move logistics over the shortest route into Iraq, even though it was obvious that other coalition armored divisions could outflank the worst of enemy defenses.

Massed firepower from the corps’ 669 artillery tubes initiated offensive action. The VII Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. Frederick M. Franks, Jr., USA, a tank officer, numbered 142,000 soldiers and included 1,587 tanks and 1,502 Bradleys and armored personnel carriers. The opposing Iraqi commander later said that 90 percent of his artillery was ready to interfere with the attack across the deep minefield. However, in a 24-hour U.S. bombardment, he lost most of his artillery capability.

Blades mounted on the front of M1A1 tanks began plowing lanes to cut holes through the huge minefield. In each lane, approximately one kilometer apart, a full battalion combat team moved forward. “There were a hundred armored vehicles or more, all on line in each lane,” Gen. Brown observed. “As far as the eye could see, tanks moved through the lanes, each about a dozen kilometers long.” He added that all of this movement had previously been rehearsed in a rear area inside Saudi Arabia. A British Army unit moved through the minefield and immediately made enemy contact.

Gen. Franks wanted all of the divisions on line and Gen. Brown’s parent brigade pulled around the British 1st Armored Division in a short arc. This passage-of-lines maneuver was extremely complicated, especially in the presence of enemy forces. Friendly units had to first be cleared while continuing to fight. As the attack progressed, the general’s tank battalion took the lead  position in a brigade wedge formation, to begin smashing the Republican Guards with overwhelming firepower.

An M1A1 Abrams moves through the desert. Superior, realistic training meant American tank crews were able to use their technology to its fullest extent. DoD photo.

Three coalition divisions on line moved toward their objective parallel with the western border of Kuwait. “The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment did a superb job of making contact and shaping the battlefield. The armored units were moving rapidly, much faster than Iraqi commanders anticipated,” Gen. Brown said. The use of Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers enabled navigation while continually maintaining speed. In Gen. Brown’s battalion there was a GPS unit in each of the company commander’s tanks. In each company, a receiver was in at least two of the platoon leader’s tanks. “This was a secret weapon that made all the difference,” he said.

“No sooner had we moved out the minefield lanes than we came under fire. But the Iraqis expected an attack to come from the direction of Wadi Al-Batin running along the Kuwait border. Because of this, Iraqi armored units were dug in facing south southwest and we came in to their flank from due west,” the general explained. “With firing positions oriented the wrong way, they were not in a position to effectively fire at our armor. Gen. Brown’s battalion had 42 fully armed tanks in the attack, including a company in reserve.

“It was night and we were using thermal sights to reliably engage targets out to 2,000 meters, and some targets at 3,000 meters,” the general illustrated. “We were rolling up their flanks and they could not present more than a dozen tanks at a time. In some cases, Iraqi tanks could not rotate their turrets, which were blocked by the spoil atop revetments. This kept them from firing in other than a generally forward position. Some Iraqi  tanks tried to pull out of their holes to maneuver, but it was hopeless. Others remained in their revetments and were passed in the dark because their was no infrared  signature for sensors to detect.

Some enemy tanks pulled out of revetments after Gen. Brown’s tanks passed them by, presenting a significant danger from the rear. The Iraqi tanks got between the battalion’s main body and the reserve company, which was moving up. Tough close-in fighting resulted. In another nearby VII Corps battalion, an Iraqi tank emerged from a revetment just as a Bradley fighting vehicle approached. The Iraqi tank was too close to engage, so the Bradley driver rammed it while its gun turret was traversing. A sergeant leaped from the Bradley and dropped a grenade down the tank hatch, according to Gen. Brown.

An M2 Bradley patrols through the wreckage of a Republican Guard fighting position. The intense fighting was won by the U.S. due to years of superior training. DoD photo.

The general marveled at the consistency of Army training that enabled armored units from Germany and a mechanized infantry division from Fort Riley, Kan., to execute “incredibly difficult fighting maneuvers. Sergeant tank commanders took it upon themselves to organize against Iraqi units moving in their rear. They maneuvered their Abrams to protect thin-skinned Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs). This was part of their training, to keep the APCs from exposure to direct fire weapons.” In this pitched battle, more than a hundred Iraqi tanks were destroyed without a single battalion loss.

The combat was “messy there for a little while, and Iraqi forces in this area proved to be very brave. The engagement was challenging; not at all like a Nintendo game, as some people seem to believe. Just before dawn, we ended up perched on top of an Iraqi dismounted infantry position,” Gen. Brown said. “At this location the Republican Guard had repositioned to face our flanking attack. However, in the dark they hadn’t got it quite right – infantry should have been forward of their tanks, but they were at the rear. We rolled through two layers of tanks and thought we had cleared Iraqi infantry.”

This article first appeared in Desert Shield/Desert Storm: 10th Anniversary.

The general’s battalion discovered itself in the midst of a great many Iraqi soldiers. Some of the enemy tried to crawl behind the M1A1s to engage them from the more vulnerable rear with Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). Gen. Brown’s tank and the adjacent tank of his operations officer were in position to bring their machine guns to bear. Thermal sights helped locate Iraqis crawling into firing positions. As this action unfolded,  the reserve company arrived to add its firepower.

Unexpectedly, thermal sights on the Abrams, the general said, also proved capable of locating mines buried in the sand around Iraqi tank positions. The mines absorbed sufficient heat from the sun to produce a thermal image on Abrams tank displays. Infrared sensors helped M1A1 drivers maneuver while avoiding mines. During firefights, shells from Iraqi tank guns repeatedly struck Abrams tanks, but failed to penetrate the sloping armor on the front and sides.

U.S. Soldiers inspect the remains of a Republican Guard fighting position. Many Republican Guard units were destroyed in their revetments before even firing a shot. DoD photo.

The general noted that it was difficult to tell cause and effect. “However, as daylight broke, our tanks found themselves in a difficult situation among some 2,000 Iraqi soldiers all along the division line. The Iraqis quickly realized how much coalition armor they were  facing. An Iraqi tank on the move some 3,000 meters away was fired on by one of the M1A1s, which blew it away – one round, one kill,” he said. The enemy quickly surrendered.

More than 1,000 Iraqis were killed on the battlefield in the brigade’s sector. An accurate count may never be known because some crews were trapped inside burned out tank hulks. The Abrams crews fired 600 rounds and destroyed 300 enemy tanks. Continuing the attack, Gen. Brown’s battalion fought a number of smaller skirmishes while moving north and east. His unit cut through the Republican Guard to reach the southern edge of VII Corps’ offensive, halfway into Kuwait. En route to another objective near Al Busayyah, the battalion moved into a blocking position along Highway 8 to halt Iraq’s escape from Kuwait.

Desert Storm provided “a wisp of the future in the value to sensors and intelligence systems,” said Gen. Brown.  Throughout the ground war the Iraqis, on their own familiar territory, were surprised by speed, maneuver and accurate fire during nighttime engagements from directions they did not expect, he concluded.

This article was first published Desert Shield/Desert Storm: The 10th Anniversary of the Gulf War.