Comments on: No More C-17s for the Air Force? http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/no-more-c-17s-for-the-air-force/ Your Source for Defense and Military News Mon, 06 Feb 2012 14:18:58 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.2.1 By: Robert F. Dorr http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/no-more-c-17s-for-the-air-force/#comment-1501 Robert F. Dorr Fri, 01 Apr 2011 10:45:35 +0000 http://theyearindefense.com/?p=3349#comment-1501 The 105th Airlift Wing, New York Air National Guard, now becomes the final; unit to acquire factory-built, brand-new C-17s. The men and women of the unit at Stewart Field in New York have mixed feelings about saying "so long:" to their old friend, the C-5 Galaxy. The change will reduce the number of jobs in the Guard unit, an always-important consideration. Now that we have passed the middle of fiscal year 2011, the Department of Defense still does not have a budget law enacted and there appear to be no plans in any pending legislation that involve C-17s. It would be nice if Boeing could find a way to sell a few more export examples. The 105th Airlift Wing, New York Air National Guard, now becomes the final; unit to acquire factory-built, brand-new C-17s. The men and women of the unit at Stewart Field in New York have mixed feelings about saying “so long:” to their old friend, the C-5 Galaxy. The change will reduce the number of jobs in the Guard unit, an always-important consideration. Now that we have passed the middle of fiscal year 2011, the Department of Defense still does not have a budget law enacted and there appear to be no plans in any pending legislation that involve C-17s. It would be nice if Boeing could find a way to sell a few more export examples.

]]> By: Robert F. Dorr http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/no-more-c-17s-for-the-air-force/#comment-355 Robert F. Dorr Sat, 25 Sep 2010 18:05:17 +0000 http://theyearindefense.com/?p=3349#comment-355 Although the 111th Congress has passed neither a defense authorization bill nor a defense appropriations bill (in a perfect world, both would be in place October 1) and neither now appears likely until a very different 112th Congress convenes on January 3, it appears unlikely that lawmakers will continue requesting C-17 Globemaster III airlifters. In the defense authorization bill that failed in the Senate on September 21, the C-17 did not even survive the mark-up process. It now appears that if it wants to keep open the Long Beach, California plant that makes these planes (and nothing else), the planemaker will have to sell its product overseas. After two decades of failing to do this, it is now making some progress. Although the 111th Congress has passed neither a defense authorization bill nor a defense appropriations bill (in a perfect world, both would be in place October 1) and neither now appears likely until a very different 112th Congress convenes on January 3, it appears unlikely that lawmakers will continue requesting C-17 Globemaster III airlifters. In the defense authorization bill that failed in the Senate on September 21, the C-17 did not even survive the mark-up process. It now appears that if it wants to keep open the Long Beach, California plant that makes these planes (and nothing else), the planemaker will have to sell its product overseas. After two decades of failing to do this, it is now making some progress.

]]> By: Myron D. Stokes, Managing Member, Global HeavyLift Holdings http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/no-more-c-17s-for-the-air-force/#comment-238 Myron D. Stokes, Managing Member, Global HeavyLift Holdings Fri, 23 Jul 2010 19:09:06 +0000 http://theyearindefense.com/?p=3349#comment-238 Colleagues: Boeing is to be commended for its continuing and bold support for C-17, despite the forces arrayed against them, as demonstrated yet again by comments expressed above. As stated in July 17 and June 1, 2010 releases from Global HeavyLift, http://ow.ly/2cXvE and http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC2/ghh-press-release-60110-updated-from-52610-52810-51410-docx3 every effort is being made by elements within the DoD, in collaboration with several international media outlets, both mainstream and in the blogosphere, to dissuade the Indian government, and the IAF, from continuing their efforts to acquire as many as 22 C-17s with the intent of addressing critical strategic/tactical airlift requirements. The latter being considered a necessary and pragmatic move as the China threat grows. It is important to mention also, according to direct knowledge, that the Ministry of Defense UK (MODUK) has allowed for the acquisition of 3 more C-17s (a total of 10) to handle current and projected global force projection/humanitarian requirements, while NATO itself is considering expansion of its multi-nation Strategic Airlift pool to 6 aircraft. The key incentive for Lockheed-Martin and Airbus-EADS anti-C17 efforts is upwards of USD200 billion in aircraft sales, inclusive of the tanker deal. We include this for the simple reason that our sources advise us that Lockheed-Martin has become a de facto partner to Airbus, with the aim of replacing the "American face" lost with the pull-out of Northrop-Grumman. This arrangement has existed in varying degrees since 2006 when Airbus advised A-400M customers quite disturbed by the continuing delays and mounting costs (prompting South Africa to cancel last year) that if they acquired C-130Js in the interim, they would buy them back when A-400M became available for delivery. One final comment regarding the "wisdom" of retrofitting 32-42 year-old C-5s (which have NEVER performed to specification even when new) relative to what seems the "best of use of defense dollars". Try this: A.) 80,000,000 for one REAMP/RERP C-5 = one still near half century old airlifter which has been notoriously unreliable throughout its service life (current: 56% mission completion rate;i.e., half the time it's flying, half the the time it's not) and is all but useless in the operational realities of asymmetric and conventional warfare scenarios existing concomitantly -- requiring rapid force projection of men and equipment directly to theater. C-5 requires significant airfield infrastructure, C-17 does not, as proven in Afghanistan, Iraq and multiple humanitarian/disaster missions. B.) On the other hand, 60.000.000, when utilized in conjunction with a Congressionally approved Transformational Recapitalization defense platform acquisition process as outlined in the November 2004 issue of Defense AT&L, which allows the USAF to resell first generation C-17A models to the private sector for 140.000.000 (market value of C-17, as assessed by one of the most respected aviation consulting firms, is in the 90-140mil range) begets a new C-17 ordered from Boeing, and by State Department mandate, immediate access to the sold C-17A in times of national emergency, or as needed. Result: A 20,000,000 savings (actually more, since it is known that the C-5 retrofit cost stated by Lockheed-Martin, will again prove unreasonably low and rapidly invoking Nunn-McCurdy) and two C-17s; one new and one with at least half its service life remaining, with a combined capacity of 174 tons. Shall we talk again about "best use of available defense dollars" and leave out the invoking of President Eisenhower, who was only referring to unreasonable waste in the defense industrial complex, and not actions that would cripple the country's ability to defend itself against enemies past, present and future... including China? Myron D. Stokes Managing Member Global HeavyLift Holdings, LLC http://emotionreportscom.blogspot.com/ Nellis/AFB AAR: Gen. B. McCaffrey http://ow.ly/2cGCz http://ow.ly/2cGMx CAMAA Encyclopedic Narrative: http://bit.ly/bUlHHM Colleagues:

Boeing is to be commended for its continuing and bold support for C-17, despite the forces arrayed against them, as demonstrated yet again by comments expressed above. As stated in July 17 and June 1, 2010 releases from Global HeavyLift, http://ow.ly/2cXvE and http://www.slideshare.net/GHHLLC2/ghh-press-release-60110-updated-from-52610-52810-51410-docx3 every effort is being made by elements within the DoD, in collaboration with several international media outlets, both mainstream and in the blogosphere, to dissuade the Indian government, and the IAF, from continuing their efforts to acquire as many as 22 C-17s with the intent of addressing critical strategic/tactical airlift requirements. The latter being considered a necessary and pragmatic move as the China threat grows.

It is important to mention also, according to direct knowledge, that the Ministry of Defense UK (MODUK) has allowed for the acquisition of 3 more C-17s (a total of 10) to handle current and projected global force projection/humanitarian requirements, while NATO itself is considering expansion of its multi-nation Strategic Airlift pool to 6 aircraft.

The key incentive for Lockheed-Martin and Airbus-EADS anti-C17 efforts is upwards of USD200 billion in aircraft sales, inclusive of the tanker deal. We include this for the simple reason that our sources advise us that Lockheed-Martin has become a de facto partner to Airbus, with the aim of replacing the “American face” lost with the pull-out of Northrop-Grumman. This arrangement has existed in varying degrees since 2006 when Airbus advised A-400M customers quite disturbed by the continuing delays and mounting costs (prompting South Africa to cancel last year) that if they acquired C-130Js in the interim, they would buy them back when A-400M became available for delivery.

One final comment regarding the “wisdom” of retrofitting 32-42 year-old C-5s (which have NEVER performed to specification even when new) relative to what seems the “best of use of defense dollars”. Try this:

A.) 80,000,000 for one REAMP/RERP C-5 = one still near half century old airlifter which has been notoriously unreliable throughout its service life (current: 56% mission completion rate;i.e., half the time it’s flying, half the the time it’s not) and is all but useless in the operational realities of asymmetric and conventional warfare scenarios existing concomitantly — requiring rapid force projection of men and equipment directly to theater. C-5 requires significant airfield infrastructure, C-17 does not, as proven in Afghanistan, Iraq and multiple humanitarian/disaster missions.

B.) On the other hand, 60.000.000, when utilized in conjunction with a Congressionally approved Transformational Recapitalization defense platform acquisition process as outlined in the November 2004 issue of Defense AT&L, which allows the USAF to resell first generation C-17A models to the private sector for 140.000.000 (market value of C-17, as assessed by one of the most respected aviation consulting firms, is in the 90-140mil range) begets a new C-17 ordered from Boeing, and by State Department mandate, immediate access to the sold C-17A in times of national emergency, or as needed.

Result: A 20,000,000 savings (actually more, since it is known that the C-5 retrofit cost stated by Lockheed-Martin, will again prove unreasonably low and rapidly invoking Nunn-McCurdy) and two C-17s; one new and one with at least half its service life remaining, with a combined capacity of 174 tons.

Shall we talk again about “best use of available defense dollars” and leave out the invoking of President Eisenhower, who was only referring to unreasonable waste in the defense industrial complex, and not actions that would cripple the country’s ability to defend itself against enemies past, present and future… including China?

Myron D. Stokes
Managing Member
Global HeavyLift Holdings, LLC
http://emotionreportscom.blogspot.com/
Nellis/AFB AAR: Gen. B. McCaffrey http://ow.ly/2cGCz http://ow.ly/2cGMx
CAMAA Encyclopedic Narrative: http://bit.ly/bUlHHM

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